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Executive Summary 
 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) 
established Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) in 1996 as the main federally 
funded program for cash assistance to needy families.  Since that time, the number of benefit 
recipients has declined dramatically.  While many TANF recipients left for employment, a 
substantial proportion experienced subsequent joblessness within the first few years following 
their exits.  Using program administrative data, this study examines the role of regular 
unemployment insurance (UI) benefits in maintaining self-sufficiency for TANF leavers who 
experience subsequent job loss.  
 
 To receive UI, both monetary and non-monetary requirements must be met.  Eligibility 
for UI benefits requires that claimants have adequate recent employment and earnings, and 
involuntary job separations not due to things like poor job performance or misconduct.  
Furthermore, UI beneficiaries must be able, available, and actively seeking full-time work.   
 
 Among TANF recipients who left the program for employment, this study examines 
subsequent joblessness, application for UI benefits, eligibility for UI benefits, and rates of UI 
benefit receipt.  The levels of TANF and UI income support are compared, and the rate of return 
to TANF is contrasted between UI beneficiaries, non-applicants, and ineligible applicants.  
Findings are compared to results from earlier studies measuring UI eligibility and receipt among 
those who left social assistance programs.   
 
Data for Analysis  
 
 TANF exit and UI receipt were studied with administrative data from four of the eight 
largest states: Florida, Ohio, Michigan, and Texas.  Access to administrative data on UI and 
TANF for Florida, Ohio, and Texas was provided through the Administrative Data Analysis and 
Research (ADARE) consortium.  Michigan directly provided the Upjohn Institute administrative 
data for research under a separate data sharing agreement.  
 
 Analysis cohorts were set up within time ranges covered in two or more states.  Cohorts 
include TANF receipt and exit in the years 1997, 2000, and 2001.  To provide additional 
evidence on a key relationship concerning job separations, a 2003 Texas cohort was added.   
These years witnessed a growing aggregate economy with tightening labor markets, a recession 
with rising unemployment, then the beginnings of a modest economic recovery.  Eleven cohorts 
of TANF leavers were examined.  For the purpose of this study, we define TANF leavers as 
those who left the TANF program for employment.  These samples totaled 556,427 TANF 
leavers with 406,481 newly unemployed within 3 years after leaving TANF (Table E1).  They 
represent a census of TANF leavers in the states studied during these years.  Each of the analysis 
cohorts studied is composed of adult grantees in TANF recipient households who left TANF for 
employment.1
 




Table E1.  Summary of Unemployment, UI Application, UI Eligibility, and UI 




TANF Leavers 556,427 
Newly Unemployed  406,481 
UI Applicants 98,760 
Monetarily Eligible for UI Benefits 89,806 
Non-monetarily Eligible for UI Benefits 35,661 
UI Beneficiaries 54,341 
  
Newly Unemployed rate 73% 
UI Applicant rate for New Unemployment 24% 
Monetarily Eligible rate for UI Applicants 91% 
Non-monetarily Eligible rate for UI Applicants 36% 
UI Beneficiary rate among Applicants 55% 
  
Weeks of UI Entitlement (mean) 19 
Weeks of UI Drawn (mean) (*1) 15 
Percentage of UI Entitlement Drawn 80% 
UI Exhaustion Rate 56% 
UI Weekly Benefit Amount (mean) $167 
UI Payments received over the full Benefit Year (mean) $2,545 
UI Actual Monthly Amount Received (mean) (*2) $533 
TANF Actual Monthly Amount Received (mean) (*3) $148 
Ratio of Mean Actual UI to Mean Actual TANF 3.6 
Note:  Percentages and means in this table are rounded to the nearest whole number. 
(*1) This is full-time equivalent weeks of UI computed as total dollars of UI benefits received divided by the 
beneficiary’s UI weekly benefit amount (WBA) for joblessness throughout a full week. 
(*2) Computed as total dollars of UI received in the benefit year divided by maximum entitled weeks of UI 
benefits times four.  The duration of entitlement and level of WBA depend directly on the level and duration of 
recent prior earnings and employment. 
(*3) TANF payments received in the two calendar quarters completed before TANF exit divided by six. 
 
Incidence of Unemployment 
 
 To learn about the relationship between UI and return to TANF, cohorts of TANF leavers 
experiencing unemployment were created.  Within three years after TANF exit, the cumulative 
rates of TANF leavers ever experiencing unemployment ranged from 68 to 80 percent across the 
analysis cohorts with a weighted mean rate of 73 percent of all TANF leavers experiencing a 
new spell of unemployment.  Figure E1 shows the nearly uniform distribution of cumulative 






 Across the cohorts, between 18 and 43 percent of newly unemployed TANF leavers 
applied for UI benefits within 3 years after leaving TANF (Figure E1).  There is wide variation 
across the cohorts in UI application rates with the mean across cohorts being 24 percent.  UI 
application rates tend to be considerably higher when the first instance of unemployment occurs 
in the second year after TANF exit than in the first, suggesting that jobless TANF leavers may 
understand that sufficient employment and earnings are required to qualify.  Based on data from 
states for which the date of job separation is available, the mean lag from job separation to the 
date of application for UI benefits is 5.8 weeks with a median of 2.0 weeks.   
 


































 Among TANF leavers who become newly unemployed and apply for UI, the percentages 
who are initially eligible for UI based on monetary requirements were above 90 percent in eight 
of the eleven cohorts analyzed (Figure E2).  The rates were 85 percent in the Florida 2001 
cohort, 66 percent in the Ohio 2000 cohort, and 61 percent in the Ohio 2001 cohort.  The lower 
monetary eligibility rates in Ohio result from the strict requirement for 20 or more weeks of work 
earning at least 27.5 percent of the state average weekly wage in UI covered employment.  For 
Ohio in the year 2000 a week of insured employment required earnings of at least $172, or more 
than 33 hours of work at the federal minimum wage of $5.15 per hour.  Including Ohio, the mean 




Figure E2.  UI Eligibility and Beneficiary Rates
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 While TANF leavers compare favorably to those not recently involved with TANF in 
terms of monetary eligibility for UI, they have much lower rates of UI eligibility based on initial 
non-monetary eligibility factors.  These relate to circumstances surrounding the job separation.  
For TANF leavers, higher rates of voluntary job quits and justifiable dismissals result in lower 
rates of non-monetary eligibility (Figure E2).  UI claimants must also be able, available, and 
actively seeking full-time work.  Among newly unemployed TANF leavers who applied for UI, 
the weighted mean rate of initial qualification for UI based on non-monetary factors across all 
cohorts was 36 percent. 
 
Receipt of UI Benefits 
 
 Among TANF leavers who are UI applicants, the proportions receiving UI benefits in the 
analysis cohorts range from 30 percent in the Ohio 2001 cohort to 65 percent in the Michigan 
2001 cohort (Figure E2).  The overall mean rate of benefit receipt was 55 percent (Table E1).  
Note that to receive benefits, claimants must satisfy both monetary and non-monetary 
requirements.  
 
 For monetary eligibility, TANF leavers with more employment and earnings in their UI 
base period satisfy monetary eligibility requirements at higher rates than those with less 
employment and earnings.  The UI base period is the first four of the five completed calendar 
quarters preceding UI application.  Therefore, we find that UI beneficiary rates among applicants 
in the first year after TANF exit are lower than among those who apply for UI benefits in their 
second or third year after leaving TANF.  That is, those for whom more time has elapsed 
between leaving TANF and applying for UI may have had more employment and earnings to 




 UI applicants who are denied for non-monetary reasons may qualify at a later point in 
their benefit year.  Thus, UI beneficiary rates can be higher than initial rates of non-monetary 
eligibility. The UI benefit year is the 52-week period starting with the week of UI application.  
Those who are initially denied UI for non-monetary reasons can become eligible later in their 
benefit year if they satisfy state-specific requirements for re-employment and earnings.  These 
denied applicants can qualify for UI if they acquire adequate additional employment and 
earnings and satisfy non-monetary eligibility requirements after a new job separation.   
 
 Comparing TANF leaver UI applicants to all other applicants, beneficiary rates among 
TANF leavers were uniformly lower than for those not recently involved with TANF.  This is 
true even though, as noted above, some TANF leaver UI applicants eventually receive benefits 
after being initially denied for non-monetary reasons.   
 
 Among TANF leavers who qualify for UI, mean weekly benefit amounts are $167, mean 
entitled durations of UI benefits are more than 19 weeks, and on average 80 percent of entitled 
UI benefits are drawn.  Mean UI payments are $2,545 over the full benefit year, or a mean of 
about 15 weeks of UI at the average weekly benefit amount for this sample.  Benefit entitlements 
are fully exhausted by 56 percent of TANF leaver UI beneficiaries, which is a higher rate of UI 
benefit exhaustion than among UI beneficiaries not recently involved with TANF. 
 
 Eligibility rates for monetary and non-monetary reasons, together with UI beneficiary 
rates are summarized graphically in Figure E2 for newly unemployed TANF leavers.  Over time, 
rates are stable within states, but differ across states.  There are very high rates of monetary 
eligibility exceeding 90 percent in Florida, Michigan, and Texas.  Beneficiary rates hover around 
60 percent for these three states.  Non-monetary eligibility rates for the Ohio cohorts are low at 
around 30 percent, but on par with Texas.  Beneficiary rates in Ohio are slightly below the non-
monetary eligibility rates.  In all other states, however, the UI beneficiary rates far exceed the 
non-monetary eligibility rates.     
 
Relationship between UI receipt and return to TANF 
 
 Among newly unemployed TANF leavers who apply for UI benefits, receipt of UI 
compensation is correlated with a significantly lower rate of return to TANF. Figure E3 
summarizes rates of return to TANF among the three key groups of newly unemployed TANF 
leavers: (1) those who do not apply for UI, (2) those who apply for UI, but do not receive UI 
benefits, and (3) UI applicants who become beneficiaries. For each of the eleven cohorts, the rate 
of return to TANF is highest for UI applicants who do not receive benefits. This result holds for 
every cohort regardless of the state rules for monetary and non-monetary UI eligibility and no 
matter what phase of the business cycle. 
 
 The mean rate of return to TANF among newly unemployed TANF leavers in our 
combined samples is 43 percent (Table E2).  Among those who apply for UI, the return to TANF 
rate is 41 percent for beneficiaries, and 53 percent for non-beneficiaries, a statistically significant 
difference of 12 percentage points.  This simple unadjusted difference of means is consistent  
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Table E2.  Return to TANF Summary Across All TANF Leaver Cohorts 




Total Newly Unemployed TANF Leavers  406,481 
  No UI Application 307,721 
  Apply for UI but no Benefits 44,419 
  Apply for UI and get Benefits 54,341 
  
Total Returns to TANF by Leavers 173,717 
  No UI Application  128,494 
  Apply for UI but no Benefits 23,370 
  Apply for UI and get Benefits 22,388 
  
Total Return to TANF Rate 43% 
  No UI Application  42% 
  Apply for UI but no Benefits 53% 
  Apply for UI and get Benefits 41% 
Note:  Figures rounded to nearest whole percentage point for this table. 
 
with estimates computed on samples pooled across cohorts and controlling for claimant 
characteristics and UI program parameters.  The percentage point difference in rates of return 
translates into a 22 percent lower rate of return to TANF among UI beneficiaries than non-
beneficiary UI applicants.  This result could be driven partly by some returning TANF applicants 
instructed to claim UI to demonstrate the absence of alternative income sources.  That question 




                                                
Contrasting TANF and UI as Income Support 
 
 Among TANF leavers who experience unemployment, those who qualify for and draw 
UI benefits receive income replacement at rates much higher than is paid by TANF.  Across the 
analysis cohorts the mean monthly TANF payment is $148 while the mean monthly UI payment 
is $533.  The UI-to-TANF ratio of mean payments is 3.6 (Table E1).   
 
 
 Mean monthly TANF payments range from $113 to $226 across cohorts, while monthly 
UI receipt ranges from $389 to $693.  The ratio of UI-to-TANF ranges from 2.0 to 4.6.  The UI-
to-TANF ratio in Ohio is about half that of Florida, however the rates of return to TANF are 
similar in the two states.  The ratio for Michigan lies between Florida and Ohio, but the rate of 
return in Michigan is significantly higher than either of the other two states. 
 
 A very small correlation was estimated between the UI-to-TANF ratio and the rate of 
return to TANF using regression models.  This suggests that UI benefit receipt might be serving 
as a proxy for strong labor force attachment.  In other words, it might not be the income 
replacement function of UI that reduces return to TANF, but more importantly those who receive 
UI benefits have better prospects for maintaining self-sufficiency through employment.  
 
Trends in UI and TANF Caseloads 
 
 In the states studied, the numbers of TANF recipients declined since 1996 with rates of 
decline faster before the year 2000 than after.  Influenced by trends in aggregate business 
activity, counts of UI recipients tended to rise in the quarters leading up to the start of 2002 then 
gradually declined.2  But there is no identifiable link between aggregate declines in TANF 
recipients and trends in total UI recipients at the state level.   
 
 Person-level analysis suggests, however, that UI plays an important role in supporting 
TANF leavers, but only a small fraction of TANF leavers receive UI benefits.  Among TANF 
leavers, about 73 percent become unemployed within 3 years, 24 percent of these apply for UI 
benefits, with 55 percent of applicants becoming beneficiaries.  This suggests that about 10 
percent of TANF leavers receive UI benefits.  
 
 Analysis of the composition of UI claims showed that the numbers of recent TANF 
recipients among UI applicants were steady over the period of years examined (O’Leary 2007).  
Furthermore, the share of UI beneficiaries who previously held high paying jobs increased 
sharply between 1997 and 2003, meaning that recent TANF recipients declined as a share of all 
UI beneficiaries.   
 
 
2The UI counts include all beneficiaries in the states and are not limited to TANF leavers. 
 
 xvii 
Conclusions and Future Research 
 
 This study estimates that among TANF leavers who become newly unemployed and 
apply for UI benefits, nearly 91 percent will be eligible for monetary reasons, 36 percent will be 
eligible for non-monetary reasons, and 55 percent will ultimately draw UI benefits.  In previous 
research, the highest estimated rate of UI benefit receipt among TANF leavers was 33 percent.  
Our results suggest that UI may serve as a safety net for TANF leavers.   
 
 We also find evidence that receipt of UI benefits is associated with a lower rate of return 
to TANF.  Among TANF leavers who apply for UI, receipt of benefits reduces the rate of return 
to TANF by 22 percent compared to the rate observed for applicants who do not qualify and 
receive UI benefits.    
 
 On a monthly basis, UI benefits are two to five times more generous than TANF 
payments.  But small changes in the relative generosity of UI-to-TANF do not affect the rate of 
return to TANF.  Taken together, these results suggest that UI benefit receipt might be serving as 
a proxy for strong labor force attachment.  It might not be the income replacement function of UI 
that reduces return to TANF, but instead those who receive UI benefits might simply have better 
prospects for maintaining self-sufficiency through employment.  Further investigation into the 
relative importance of UI income support and labor force attachment could inform policy.  
 
 Also, it is worth investigating why rates of return to TANF are similar after a new spell of 
unemployment for UI beneficiaries and those who do not apply for UI benefits.  What 
characteristics do these two groups share and how are they different from TANF leavers who 
apply but fail to receive UI benefits?  
 
 Finally, among all UI applicants, TANF leavers have lower rates of qualifying for UI 
benefits. The main reasons for lower rates of UI eligibility among TANF leavers are voluntary 
job quits and dismissals for cause by employers.  Analysis of the characteristics of TANF leavers 
who voluntarily quit or get fired from new jobs could provide guidance for efforts to promote job 
retention and advancement among recent TANF leavers.   
 
 1 
                                                
1.  Introduction 
 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 
1996 replaced federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).  The new law changed the character of public cash 
support by introducing lifetime limits and adding work requirements for continued benefit 
eligibility.  Incentives and rewards were established for states to encourage self-sufficiency 
through employment. These changes combined with a strong economic expansion to induce a 
mass exodus from TANF rolls (King and Mueser 2005).  This trend was slowed but not arrested 
by the 2001-02 economic recession.3  Recent years have seen TANF rolls continue to decline 
during a modest recovery from the recession.  
 
 Investigations into the maintenance of self-sufficiency for new TANF leavers have 
identified traditional government funded employment and training programs as an important part 
of the story.  Among these programs unemployment insurance (UI) has been singled out as a 
possible reason why TANF leavers remained self sufficient during the 2001-02 recession (Isaacs 
2005).  Using state administrative data from four of the eight largest states, this study expands on 
prior knowledge about the use of UI by recent TANF leavers (Kaye 2001, Rangarajan and 
Razafindratoko 2004).  Direct measures of UI application, eligibility, and benefit receipt from 
administrative data matched with TANF payment data illuminate clear patterns of client use and 
flows between the two programs.   
 
 Access to administrative data on UI and TANF for Florida, Ohio, and Texas was 
provided through the Administrative Data Analysis and Research (ADARE) consortium 
supported by the U.S. Department of Labor and managed by the Jacob France Institute at the 
University of Baltimore.4  Bilateral data sharing agreements were concluded between each state 
and the Upjohn Institute.  Texas provided UI administrative records to the Upjohn Institute, but 
Texas TANF records were acquired and analyzed at the Ray Marshall Center, University of 
Texas.  Michigan provided the Upjohn Institute administrative data for research outside the 
ADARE consortium under a separate data sharing agreement.  
2.  Background 
 The introduction of TANF with lifetime limits and work requirements for continued 
receipt of cash assistance increased the importance of employment and training programs for 
achieving self-sufficiency for TANF leavers.  Research before TANF suggested that few leavers 
from cash assistance would qualify for UI, but analysis after TANF was in place estimated 
higher UI recipiency rates (Gustafson and Levine 1997, Rangarajan, Razafindrakoto, and 
Corson, 2002).  As background for the present research, we examine UI and TANF eligibility 
rules in each of the four states analyzed and review prior research on use of UI by TANF leavers.  
 
3National Bureau of Economic Research (2001). 
4These three states are representative of the nine state ADARE consortium, which includes California, 




                                                
  
 Isaacs (2005) reported that between 2000 and 2003, the proportion of low-income single 
mothers receiving UI benefits at some point in the year increased from 4.6 to 6.7 percent.  It is 
not surprising to see an increase in receipt of UI in times of rising unemployment. What is 
noteworthy is that the higher UI recipiency rate has continued since 2000, despite the 2001-02 
slowdown in aggregate economic activity.   
2.1  UI eligibility and benefits 
 Unemployment insurance eligibility rules are set to ensure that those compensated are 
strongly attached to the labor force and temporarily jobless through no fault of their own.  To 
qualify initially for UI, a claimant must have sufficient prior earnings and employment – these 
are called monetary eligibility conditions.  Furthermore, the job separation must be involuntary.  
Non-monetary eligibility rules prohibit quits and discharge for misconduct or other causes 
justifiable by an employer.  Employer discharge for cause is usually related to frequent tardiness, 
unexplained absences, misconduct, or poor job performance.5  UI applicants must also be able, 
available, and actively seeking full-time work, as defined by UI rules.  For initial and continuing 
eligibility, beneficiaries may not refuse an offer of suitable work. 
 
 Monetary eligibility for UI is determined by base period earnings.  The UI base period is 
normally the first four of the previous five completed calendar quarters before the date of claim 
for benefits.6  Table 1 lists the minimum base period earnings required to qualify for the 
minimum UI weekly benefit amount.  For 1997, base period earnings requirements in the four 
states studied ranged from $1,628 in Texas to $3,400 in Florida.  By 2003, the requirement 
remained at $2,640 in Ohio, had not changed in Florida, and had risen to $2,997 in Michigan, 
and to $1,887 in Texas.7  
 
5 In the case of benefit denial due to voluntary quit or discharge for cause, the UI applicant may re-qualify 
for UI benefits in the following manner:  In Florida, by earning 17 times the client’s weekly benefit amount (WBA); 
In Michigan, by earning the lesser of seven times the client’s WBA or seven times 40 times Michigan’s minimum 
wage (7 x 40 x MI minimum wage); In Ohio, by having six weeks of work in covered employment with the amount 
of wages in each week at least 27.5 percent of the state’s average weekly wage; and for Texas, by earning six times 
the client’s WBA.  Source:  “Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws (2001),” U.S. Department of 
Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Tables 401 and 402. 
6For claimants not eligible based on earnings in the standard base period, earnings in an alternate base year 
(ABY) – the most recent four completed calendar quarters, is checked in Michigan and Ohio.  In Texas an ABY 
may be considered where work is missed due to a medically verifiable illness, injury, disability, or pregnancy during 
a major portion of the usual base period.  An ABY amendment was considered in the 2002 Florida legislature, but 
did not pass both houses.   
7The Base Period Earnings (BPE) requirement is indexed to a multiple of the state average weekly wage 
(AWW) in UI covered employment or the state minimum wage in Michigan, and to a multiple of the minimum 
WBA in Texas.  The required level of earnings to qualify for UI is set by the legislatures in Florida and Ohio.  
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Table 1.  Comparison of State Provisions for UI and TANF Programs 
 Florida Michigan Ohio Texas 
UI Minimum Base Period Earnings  
(*1) 
1997   




















































































TANF Earnings Disregard 
(Table does not show small changes in 
rules over time or other disregards that 
may affect benefits.) 
$200 plus 50% of 
remainder 
$200 plus 20% of 
remainder 
$250 plus 25% of 
remainder 
$120 plus 90% of 
remainder (33% 
for eligibility), 
$120 after 4 mos.





















$1568 / 308 
1581 / 321 
1581 / 321 
1593 / 333 

























NOTE:  (*1) Base period earnings (BPE) is the sum of earnings in the first four of the previous five completed calendar quarters.  
For Michigan in 1997 and 2000, the requirement is for at least 20 weeks in which the person earns 30 times the state minimum 
wage ($101). An alternative, flat requirement is 14 weeks of work and base period earnings that total 20 times the state’s 
average weekly wage. High quarter earnings requirement is $2,667 for Florida for all years and is $1,998 in 2002-2003 for 
Michigan. 
(*2) For Ohio, the weeks of work requirement is 20 weeks at 27.5 percent of the state’s average weekly wage.  The earnings 
requirements implied by the Ohio rule are listed in the UI covered weeks of work row. 
(*3) State average weekly wage (AWW) earned by those working in UI covered employment for study states. 
(*4) This is the point at which the TANF benefit is zero due to earnings.  Breakeven earnings is computed as (TANF benefit 
amount) divided by (1-disregard rate) plus the lump sum disregard.  Texas has a $1,400 cap on the earned income that can be 
subject to the 90 percent disregard for 4 of 12 months of TANF receipt (HHS 2006, Table 12-5, footnote 8).   
(*5) Family of three (one adult and two children with no income). 




                                                
 Some states have a high quarter earnings requirement.8  Most states also have an earnings 
dispersion requirement – all of the four states studied require earnings in at least two calendar 
quarters of the base period.  Ohio is one of a few states in the nation with a base period 
employment requirement, and it is a very restrictive rule.9  The Ohio weeks of employment rule 
limits eligibility to those with at least 20 weeks of work in which earnings each week are at least 
27.5 percent of the state average weekly wage in covered employment (Table 1).  For Ohio in 
2000, a week of insured employment required earnings of at least $172, which is, more than 33 
hours of work at the federal minimum wage of $5.15 per hour.  
 
 For those who qualify, UI pays benefits weekly with the cash amount increasing with the 
level of prior earnings up to a state maximum.  Table 1 lists the state-wide average UI weekly 
benefit amounts.  Also listed in Table 1 are average weekly wages of all workers covered by UI 
in the states examined for the years of our analysis cohorts.  This provides a sense of the average 
wage replacement rate provided by UI to regular full-time workers.   
 
 Prior research has suggested that TANF leavers would have a high probability of passing 
monetary eligibility requirements, but speculates that non-monetary eligibility requirements 
would eliminate a greater share of TANF leavers from UI eligibility.  Regarding monetary 
eligibility, prior research has failed to recognize the importance of employment requirements 
separate from earnings rules, and there has been little prior direct evidence on the job separation 
patterns for recent TANF leavers. 
2.2  TANF eligibility and benefits 
 Needy families with dependent children and earnings below the breakeven thresholds 
listed in Table 1 may have qualified for cash TANF assistance.  States set maximum monthly 
TANF grant amounts and resource levels.  Resource limits apply to liquid financial and vehicle 
assets.  There are also employment requirements for continued TANF eligibility.  Work is 
required immediately upon receipt of benefits in 28 states, within six months in 9 states, and 
within 24 months in 13 states.  States also impose lifetime limits between 24 and 60 months on 
receipt of benefits (HHS 2000).   
 
 Regarding earnings, each state sets its own rules. Over half the states disregard a lump 
sum and a portion of the rest of the earnings up to the breakeven level of income, at which point 
the household has worked off TANF.10  Other states disregard a portion of earnings.  In addition, 
these disregards are often time limited. Some states have adjusted parameters to permit continued 
support with household income at thresholds as high as four times the poverty level.  In 
computing benefits, other disregards may apply, such as for child care.  TANF benefits and 
earnings levels across our cohorts are quite similar for Florida, Michigan, and Ohio.  For Texas, 
 
8The minimum base period earnings to qualify for UI is 1.5 times the minimum high quarter earnings in 
Florida and Michigan. 
9Three other states have employment requirements.  New Jersey requires 20 weeks or a different earnings 
formula.  Pennsylvania requires 16 weeks.  The Washington rule requires 680 hours and one dollar of earnings.   
10Breakeven earnings are computed as the TANF benefit amount divided by (1-disregard rate) plus the 
lump sum disregard.   
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benefits are lower but earnings eligibility is much higher for the first four months and severely 
limited thereafter (Table 1).  In some cases, these rules changed over the period covered by this 
study. 
 
 For the present analysis, a key aspect of TANF eligibility in the study states is an 
administrative requirement that to qualify for additional cash assistance, applicants must claim 
all other available sources of income.  Rangarajan, Razafindrakoto, and Corson (2002) note that 
New Jersey had such a rule in place under AFDC and continued to apply it under TANF.  
Similar administrative rules are in place in Michigan, Ohio, and Texas.  
 
 The TANF eligibility manual for the State of Michigan, Department of Human Services 
states that, “clients must apply for benefits for which they may be eligible. ... refusal by a 
program group member to pursue a potential benefit results in group ineligibility” (State of 
Michigan 2007, PEM 270, pp. 1-6).11  The Michigan manual specifically identifies UI as a 
potential source of cash payments to an unemployed person, and lists instructions on how to file 
an application for UI.    
 
 Ohio administrative rules state that “the assistance group must apply for any monthly 
benefits to which it is entitled.  Ineligibility to participate in OWF results if the assistance group 
refuses to accept unconditionally available income” (ODJFS 2007, p. 350).12  Ohio Works First 
(OWF) is the financial assistance portion of Ohio’s TANF program.  Ohio Works First provides 
cash benefits to eligible needy families for up to 36 months. After 36 months, a family cannot 
receive additional cash assistance unless the County Department of Job and Family Services 
approves an extension of benefits.   
 
 The Texas Administrative Code permits return to TANF before all other sources of 
income are exhausted, but application for any other available income must be made within 90 
days to maintain TANF eligibility.13  The Texas Health and Human Services Commission 
(HHSC) requires TANF applicants/recipients to pursue and accept all income to which they are 
legally entitled.  HHSC does not require a TANF applicant to apply for UI benefits or provide 
proof that they have applied for UI benefits before their TANF application is approved.  The 
policy guidance suggests that a reasonable time, at least three months, is allowed for pursuit of 
other income.  This particular policy is not recent; it dates to prior administration of the AFDC 
program.   
 
 These rules could lower measured eligibility rates among TANF leaver UI applicants.  
Some with little expectation of qualifying for UI may be forced to jump this hurdle on their way 
back to TANF.  Knowing this could help us understand an important pattern in the data.  
 
11Legal basis for this policy by the Michigan Department of Human Services is set forth in Michigan Public 
Act 280 of 1939, as amended, which is known as the Social Welfare Act.   
12Administrative Legal basis for this policy by the Michigan Department of Human Services is set forth in 
Michigan Public Act 280 of 1939, as amended, which is known as the Social Welfare Act. Policy requiring claiming 
of UI is stated in the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS) Cash Assistance Manual.   
13Legal basis for this policy is in the Texas Administrative Code, Title 1, Part 15, Chapter 372 (Texas 
Works), Subchapter B (Eligibility), Division 7 (Income).    
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Consider the three groups of TANF leavers who experience joblessness: (1) UI applicants who 
get benefits, (2) UI applicants who don’t get benefits, and (3) non-applicants for UI.  Rates of 
return to TANF are similar for groups (1) and (3), while the return to TANF rates for group (2) 
are much higher.  This result may be partly driven by TANF eligibility requirements to claim UI 
benefits.  It is important to consider these rules when interpreting estimates of the relationship of 
UI with the rate of return to TANF.   
2.3  Previous research on employment and earnings of TANF leavers 
 Acs and Loprest (2004) survey and synthesize results from 18 TANF leaver studies done 
in 14 states covering activity from 1996 to 2000.  They examine work among leavers, 
characteristics of leavers who are not working, and the well-being of TANF leaver families.  
They account for differences in methodologies when drawing conclusions from the studies.  Acs 
and Loprest (2004) find that a majority (about 60 percent) worked after leaving TANF.  When 
working, TANF leavers tend to earn above the federal minimum wage, but less than half of all 
working leavers receive a full set of employment benefits like paid sick leave, health insurance, 
and paid vacations.  During the year after leaving TANF, 70 percent worked at some time, but 
only 40 percent worked in every quarter throughout the year.  They estimated that about 20 
percent of TANF leavers returned to TANF within a year.  Another 10 percent have no 
observable earnings, but did not return to TANF.  On average, leaver families had relatively low 
earnings, with 40 to 50 percent living below the official poverty level of income in the first year 
after leaving TANF.  
 
 King and Mueser (2005) observe that welfare caseloads in the U.S. hit a peak of over 5 
million households in 1994, then rapidly declined by more than half in five years.  They studied 
the impact of welfare reform on caseloads and the labor market success of TANF leavers in six 
major metropolitan areas in the U.S. (Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Fort Lauderdale, Houston, 
and Kansas City).  To understand the whole picture, King and Mueser looked beyond TANF exit 
rates to impacts on long-term welfare recipients, new entrants to TANF, employment of TANF 
recipients, employment of TANF leavers, and the characteristics of jobs held by those involved 
with TANF.  They found that during the 1990s work increased substantially among TANF 
recipients and also increased among TANF leavers.  The kinds of jobs obtained, however, by 
TANF recipients and leavers did not change much from earlier periods.  Furthermore, job 
stability was low among those involved in work and most jobs obtained did not provide wages 
and benefits adequate to assure self-sufficiency.    
2.4  Previous research on use of UI by TANF leavers 
 Some research was done on the interaction between cash assistance and UI before 
enactment of TANF.  Based on employment patterns of women who received Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) and then left the program, Spalter-Roth, Hartman, and Burr 
(1994) estimated that only about 10 percent of those who left AFDC for employment would 
actually collect UI benefits if they subsequently became jobless.  Kaye (1997) estimated that 
about 13 percent of women leaving AFDC would actually draw a UI benefit, while about 35 




Table 2.  Previous Estimates for Welfare Leavers of Percentage Rates for UI Monetary and Non-










National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
aged 14 to 22 in 1979.  Data from 1979 
to 1994 on 43,913 job separations 
including 4,213 by AFDC leavers.  
Up to 85% About 25% About 10% 
Vroman (1998) Estimates based on 1996 UI state wage 
and earnings, state UI recipiency and 
eligibility rates, assuming part time 
minimum wage employment.   
- - Up to 20% 
Holzer (2000) Estimates based on 1997-1999 
employment and earnings of hired 
welfare recipients in a survey of 3,000 
employers in 4 large American cities. 
- - Under 30% 
Kaye (2001) Survey of Program Dynamics data for 
the year 2000 on 56,0000 persons.  
Simulated UI eligibility for those at risk 
of welfare receipt. 
81% 36% 25% 
Rangarajan, 
Razafindrakoto, 
and Corson (2002)  
New Jersey data from the Work First NJ 
evaluation tracking 2,000 TANF 
beneficiaries in the 18 months starting 
July 1997. 




National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work 
grants in metropolitan counties in five 
states.  TANF leavers September 1999 
to August 2000.  Each state sample 
ranged in size from 1,000 to 15,000. 
90% - - 
 
 Gustafson and Levine (1997) examined leavers from AFDC using data from the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth and estimated the proportion who would satisfy simulated UI 
monetary eligibility in data spanning 1979 to 1994.  Among those leaving welfare, they 
estimated that 70 to 85 percent would satisfy the monetary eligibility requirements for UI and 
about 25 percent of women with job separations would satisfy non-monetary eligibility 
requirements for UI.  Since only a fraction of UI eligible unemployed actually draw UI 
compensation, they estimate about 10 percent of AFDC leavers would get UI benefits.  They 
assert that the provision mandating that separations be “involuntary” would prevent most 
workers from gaining UI eligibility and conjectured that the UI system will provide little 
additional support to the safety net following welfare reform.   
 
 Vroman (1998) examined average earnings rates and UI eligibility requirements across 
states at the time TANF was implemented.  He reported that about 35 percent of all unemployed 
persons receive UI benefits with that rate higher at the beginning of recessions and in states with 
weaker eligibility criteria.  He speculated that compared to others in the workforce, TANF 
leavers are likely to have higher jobless rates, lower wage rates, higher rates of voluntary quits 
and discharges, and lower availability for full-time work.  Vroman inferred that among jobless 
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TANF leavers only about 20 percent will qualify for UI benefits.  He warns that UI is not likely 
to evolve in ways that broaden eligibility for TANF leavers and that UI is, “likely to play a very 
limited support role for TANF leavers.”  (Vroman 1998, p. 5) 
 
 Holzer (2000) examined earnings and employment of TANF leavers in the years 
immediately following implementation of TANF.  Based on his survey of 3,000 employers in 
four large American cities between 1997 and 1999, he asserted that more claimants would 
qualify monetarily for UI than in earlier years.  Nonetheless, Holzer warned that several 
remaining barriers to UI eligibility could be significant.  These include: job separations due to 
voluntary quits and dismissals for cause, lack of availability for full-time work, and employment 
in informal jobs or others not covered by UI. 
 
 Kaye (2001) estimates the likelihood that workers at risk of public assistance receipt 
would meet UI monetary and non-monetary eligibility requirements in 2000.  Her analysis uses 
the nationally representative Survey of Program Dynamics (SPD).  Annual waves of the SPD 
include responses from about 16,000 households and 56,000 persons.  She is able to simulate UI 
eligibility for all but the nine least populated states.  She does not analyze welfare leavers, but 
rather those at risk of welfare receipt.  She estimates that 81 percent of at-risk workers would 
meet the UI monetary eligibility requirements in 1998.  Among these, Kaye estimates that less 
than three-quarters had a qualifying job separation, 40 percent were not available for full-time 
work, and 64 percent were unlikely to be both available and actively seeking work.  The net 
result is a beneficiary rate of about 25 percent among likely UI applicants.  
 
 Rangarajan, Razafindrakoto, and Corson (2002) studied the extent to which former 
welfare recipients are likely to be eligible for UI and the rate at which those who leave TANF for 
work file UI claims.  Their analysis is based on data from the Work First New Jersey (WFNJ) 
evaluation which tracks a representative statewide sample of 2,000 TANF recipients who were 
paid benefits during the first 18 months after TANF started in July 1997.  They found that nearly 
75 percent of those who left TANF for employment would be monetarily eligible for UI at some 
point during the first two years after TANF exit.  Among these, about 40 percent would satisfy 
non-monetary eligibility requirements.  UI ineligibility for non-monetary reasons would be twice 
as high among TANF leavers as for all other UI claimants in New Jersey.  This could be driven 
in part by the TANF requirement to claim UI before returning to TANF.  Overall, about one-
third of TANF leavers would potentially satisfy both monetary and non-monetary eligibility 
criteria.  Potential monthly UI benefits for this group would average about $866 per month, 
compared with maximum monthly TANF benefits of $424 for a family of three.  Relaxing 
monetary eligibility requirements would modestly raise the share of TANF leavers who would 
qualify.  Relaxing the weeks of work requirement has a greater effect than relaxing the earnings 
requirement.  Alternative base-period rules that consider more recent earnings would allow 
TANF leavers to qualify for UI faster, but the proportion qualifying would not increase much. 
 
 Sanford et al. (2003) did a correlation analysis of factors related to UI monetary 
eligibility for a sample of 3,085 of the 3,097 welfare recipients in Wisconsin who left TANF for 
work in the second quarter of 1998.  They found that monetary eligibility for UI had a strong 
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positive correlation with being a high school graduate, and having access to child care and 
medical insurance coverage.  They estimated a negative correlation between UI monetary 
eligibility and the presence of a child less than 6 years of age.  
 
 Rangarajan and Razafindrakoto (2004) study the extent to which former welfare 
recipients would have monetary eligibility for UI if they were to experience a qualifying job 
separation.  They used data from the national evaluation of the Welfare-to-Work (WtW) Grants 
Program.  The sample included those who left TANF for employment between September 1999 
and August 2000.  Employment and earnings were tracked for 8 calendar quarters after TANF 
exit.  Sample sizes ranged between 1,000 and 15,000 welfare recipients who exited welfare for 
work in five sites in Maricopa County, Arizona; Cook County, Illinois; Baltimore County, 
Maryland; Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania; and Tarrant County, Texas. They estimated that 
90 percent would potentially attain UI monetary eligibility in the two-year period after TANF 
exit, while between 50 percent and 80 percent would qualify in any quarter during the two-year 
period.  The rate of potential monetary eligibility was estimated to increase with the length of 
time from TANF exit to first jobless experience.  Rates of expected monetary eligibility were not 
sensitive to changes in program eligibility rules.  Changes examined included adjustments to 
consider more recent earnings when determining benefit eligibility and relaxing rules requiring 
availability for full-time work.   
3.  TANF Leaver Samples for Analysis 
 Samples of TANF leavers were created from administrative data on recipients of public 
cash assistance in each of the states.  The samples include those voluntarily leaving TANF for 
employment.  Samples exclude those who fail to receive a TANF cash payment because of a 
sanction or other involuntary reason.  Due to the periodicity of some administrative data needed 
for the study, the time unit for analysis is the calendar quarter.  Because of the uneven time 
periods for data available across the states, a cohort approach was taken for defining samples for 
analysis.  A total of eleven cohorts were examined across the four states.  Definitions of the time 
frames for the analysis cohorts are listed in Appendix A.   
3.1  Criteria for sample inclusion 
 Leaving TANF for employment is defined as: zero cash TANF payment to the assistance 
unit in a calendar quarter (with no sanction) and with earnings of at least $100 in that calendar 
quarter or the next quarter. 
 
 Key concepts in the analysis are: 
 
 TANF exit for employment is defined as zero cash TANF payment to the assistance unit 
in a calendar quarter with earnings of at least $100 in that calendar quarter or the next quarter.  
The zero payment must not be due to a sanction. 
 
 Employment is defined as earnings of at least $100 in a calendar quarter.  This definition 
is the same as that applied by the Social Security Administration when measuring the duration of 




 Unemployment is defined as a calendar quarter with earnings less than $100. 
 
 All three of these concepts are measured using UI administrative records on earnings as 
reported quarterly by employers.  The definition of unemployment is a very strict one and 
certainly understates the true extent of experience with joblessness in the samples.   
 
 Samples from all states involved in the study are analyzed for calendar year 2000 TANF 
receipt cohorts.  These samples include TANF recipients in calendar year 2000 who exit from 
TANF for employment by the first calendar quarter of 2001.  Analysis is conducted on earlier 
and later TANF exit cohorts where data are available for other states.  The four alternative TANF 
exit time frames are: (1) TANF receipt 1997Q2 to 1998Q1 and exit by 1998Q2, (2) TANF 
receipt 2000Q1 to 2000Q4 and exit by 2001Q1, (3) TANF receipt 2001Q1 to 2001Q4 and exit 
by 2002Q1, and (4) TANF receipt 2003Q1 to 2003Q4 and exit by 2004Q1.  TANF leavers in 
each cohort are followed for 3 years after TANF exit to check for the start of any jobless spells.   
3.2  Characteristics of samples for analysis 
 The states involved in this study are four of the eight most highly populated states in the 
nation.  Consequently, the TANF caseloads and levels of UI claims are large enough to reliably 
measure outcomes and impacts of interest.  For the analysis, we are first interested in a sample of 
those who leave TANF for employment.  Table 3 lists the total number of adults in TANF 
households in the data provided by states for calendar years starting with 1996 for Texas.   
Figure 1 shows that the numbers of TANF caseloads declined dramatically in Florida, Michigan, 
and Texas up until 2000.  Following 2000, yearly declines in the numbers of TANF caseloads 
were much smaller in the data for all four states.   
 
 TANF leaver sample sizes are listed in the middle panel of Table 3 for the 1997, 2000, 
2001, and 2003 cohorts.  The bottom panel of this table lists the shares of TANF recipients in 
each of the 11 analysis cohorts who leave for employment.  TANF recipients and leaver counts 
are presented in the bar graph Figure 2.  The figure illustrates a steady volume of caseloads in 
2000 and after.  For Florida and Michigan counts of TANF leavers were relatively high in 1997, 
with the numbers of leavers successively smaller in both states in 2000 and 2001.  Numbers of 
both TANF recipients and TANF leavers declined in Ohio between 2000 and 2001.  In Texas, 
the numbers of TANF recipients declined sharply from 1997 to 2000 then remained relatively 
flat until 2003.  Counts of Texas TANF leavers renewed an upward trend in 2000.   
 
 The TANF exit rates vary across state and over time.  Figure 3 illustrates that exit rates 
tended to rise from 1997 to 2000 and then decline thereafter.  Exit rates were highest in the 
Florida 2000 cohort (62.4 percent) and lowest in the Michigan 1997 cohort (27.9 percent) with 
other Michigan, Ohio, and Texas cohort exit rates somewhat above the lower end of the range. 
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Table 3.  TANF Recipients, TANF Leavers, and Rates of Leaving TANF 
for Employment 
Cohort Florida Michigan Ohio Texas 























































































NOTES:   
The 1997 cohort includes TANF recipients in 1997Q2 to 1998Q1 who exit by 1998Q2.  
The 2000 cohort includes TANF recipients in 2000Q1 to 2000Q4 who exit by 2001Q1.  
The 2001 cohort includes TANF recipients in 2001Q1 to 2001Q4 who exit by 2002Q1.  
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 To understand demographics for our analysis cohorts we summarize characteristics of UI 
claimants among TANF leavers.  Consistent data on demographic characteristics are only 
available on a limited number of variables.  These data are gathered in applications for benefits 
compiled in UI administrative records.  Table 4 presents sample percentages on subgroups by 
age, sex, race, and educational attainment, and the mean value for base period earnings.14   
 
 Based on three broad age categories, the distributions for the TANF leaver cohorts are 
similar across the states with the bulk of the samples in the middle range aged 25 to 44.  TANF 
                                                 
14The UI base period is typically the first four of the five calendar quarters immediately preceding the 
quarter of UI application for benefits.  For those who fail this first test, UI eligibility can be evaluated alternatively 
based on the four most recent calendar quarters.   
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leavers in the Michigan sample tend to be slightly older than for the other states.  Over the years, 
from 1997 to 2001 the mean age in all cohorts tends to get younger, providing some evidence 
that older TANF recipients left the roles sooner after introduction of the PRWORA reforms.    
 
 Since our analysis cohorts are samples of TANF leavers, it is not surprising to see female 
percentages ranging from 81.2 in the Michigan 2001 cohort to 87.8 in the Florida 1997 cohort.  
The gender compositions are relatively stable across all cohorts.   
 
 Percentages of African Americans in analysis cohorts are fairly steady within states over 
time.  While similar between Florida and Michigan, percentages are somewhat higher in Ohio 
and lower in Texas.  The percentages of African Americans range from 35.5 in Texas 2001 to 
55.5 in Ohio 2000.  
  
 The distribution of educational attainment is skewed toward the low end for all of the 
cohorts analyzed.  The highest levels of educational attainment are observed in Michigan where 
more than a quarter of the 2000 and 2001 cohorts have received some formal education beyond 
high school. 
 
 For all of the four states analyzed, base period earnings declined over time in the cohorts 
examined.  Nonetheless, given the modest monetary eligibility requirements discussed above, 
these figures suggest high rates of UI monetary eligibility for the TANF leaver cohorts.  Average 
earnings levels for TANF leavers are similar in Florida and Texas, somewhat higher in 
Michigan, and somewhat lower in Ohio. 
 
 Data available on dependents of household heads indicates that the great majority of 
TANF leaver households include three persons with two children, including one under the age of 
six.   
3.3  Employment and earnings before and after TANF exit 
 Employment as a route to self-sufficiency is the emphasis of the PRWORA reforms.  
Employment patterns in the cohorts analyzed indicate that the great majority of TANF leavers 
have customary attachment to the workforce which is observed to increase following TANF exit. 
 
 By definition, persons in our TANF exit cohorts must be working either in the quarter of 





Table 4.  Characteristics of TANF Leaver UI Applicants (Sample Percentages and Means) 
1997 Cohorts 2000 Cohorts 2001 Cohorts  





Age  (%)             
    18-24 20.4 14.9 23.9 20.5 28.6 24.6 26.4 21.7 30.7 31.5 34.6 24.6 
    25-44 76.6 76.6 73.4 71.6 66.5 69.5 70.9 71.6 64.6 63.9 61.3 69.7 
    45+ 3.0 8.5 2.6 7.8 4.9 5.9 2.6 6.6 4.7 4.7 4.1 5.7 
             
Female (%) 87.8 84.9 86.8 84.7 84.7 85.2 85.4 81.2 82.4 83.0 82.1 84.2 
African American (%) 47.1 37.9 48.7 46.0 55.5 36.5 47.0 43.2 53.8 35.5 36.4 40.1 
             
Education  (%)             
    Less than HS 35.5 34.1 34.9 27.6 47.4 36.9 33.5 26.8 48.7 36.4 35.3 35.7 
    HS Grad or GED 52.3 55.0 50.3 47.3 47.3 53.7 50.6 46.4 46.5 53.9 54.6 52.9 
    Some College 10.1 9.0 12.0 22.3 4.8 8.0 13.2 23.6 4.5 8.2 8.4 9.6 
    Bachelors or Higher 2.1 1.7 2.8 2.7 0.6 1.3 2.8 3.1 0.4 1.4 1.5 1.7 
             
Prior Earnings ($, *1) 11,123 12,093 10,774 12,185 9,445 10,751 9,649 10,948 8,908 10,606 10,807 11,031 
             
Dependents (  *2)             
    Under Age 18  2.08  1.98 1.90 2.10  1.95 1.88 2.07 2.04 2.05 
    Under Age 6  0.87  0.94 0.84 1.01  0.95 0.86 1.08 1.08 0.97 
             
NOTE:  Variable means summarized in this table were calculated over the full time range of UI data available for states.  
(*1) Mean earnings in the UI base period prior to filing the UI claim. The base period is the first four of the five completed calendar quarters before a UI claim. 
(*2) Mean numbers of dependents.  Data are available on dependents in TANF recipient households only for Michigan and Ohio. 
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are usually highest in the quarter of exit, and are typically higher after exit than before.  What is 
surprising is just how high employment rates are in the four years preceding TANF exit.   
 
 Employment rates are summarized in Table 5 at annual intervals for up to 4 years (16 
calendar quarters) before and after the quarter of TANF exit (also see Figures 4a, 4b, and 4c).  
The table also lists the employment rates in the quarters immediately preceding and following 
the quarter of TANF exit.  Employment rates in the quarter of TANF exit exceed 85 percent for 
nearly all cohorts.   
 
 Texas presents a notably distinct pattern in employment rates that is clearly visible in 
Figures 4a, 4b, and 4c.  Peak employment rates tend to occur in the quarter before TANF exit, 
then decline thereafter.  This pattern is most likely a result of the unique Texas earnings 
disregard rules for TANF recipients.  As summarized in Table 1, in the first 4 months of 
receiving TANF cash assistance, up to $1,593 dollars can be earned before benefits fall to zero.  
In the fifth month, the breakeven level of earnings drops to $333.  This emerges as a strong 
incentive for TANF exit. 
 
 Across all TANF leaver cohorts, employment rates gradually rise in the years preceding 
TANF exit, and then diminish in the years afterward.  Part of the observed pattern in earlier years 
may be due to the rather young average age of persons in the analysis cohorts.  The stronger 
labor force attachment observed after TANF exit may be due to maturation and accumulated 
work experience.  However, the 1996 PRWORA reforms also introduced strong incentives for 
staying employed and off TANF.   
 
 One year after TANF exit, more than 60 percent are employed in each of the cohorts and 
two years later more than 57 percent showed employment income.  Typically, at least half were 
working a year before TANF exit while at least 45 percent worked two years before leaving 
TANF. 
 
 Average annual earnings were uniformly higher in years after TANF exit than before.  
Earnings summarized in Table 6 and Figures 5a, 5b, and 5c are reported in current dollars--not 
adjusted for inflation.  Wage inflation averaged less than 3 percent per year from 1997 to 2003.15  
In that period earnings increases in the TANF leaver cohorts averaged more than double the rate 
of wage inflation.  The increase in observed earnings most likely resulted from an increase in 
hours worked per year after TANF exit compared to before. 
 
 As Table 6 shows for all cohorts, mean annual earnings among working TANF leavers 
continue to rise in the four years observed after the TANF exit quarter.  However, mean earnings 
for each year after TANF exit in all cohorts are at rates near poverty thresholds for three-person 
households.16
 
15National Compensation Survey means across all occupations 1997 to 2003 (BLS 2008).   
16Mean household sizes include two one adult and two children with one under age six.  Three person 




Table 5.  Employment Rates (percent) in Calendar Quarters Before and After Quarter of TANF Exit 
1997 Cohorts 2000 Cohorts 2001 Cohorts  





Qtr Relative to Exit             
-16 36.2  40.8  39.1 40.2 48.4  45.9 44.3 50.3 43.0 
-12 41.2  49.6 41.2 44.8 46.3 56.3 56.8 52.8 49.7 55.0 48.9 
-8 45.3 45.4 57.5 57.5 52.0 50.2 61.9 62.9 59.3 52.9 54.1 52.9 
-4 50.5 45.3 59.0 60.8 57.2 47.7 60.5 63.1 61.6 50.8 47.5 53.3 
-1 76.3 86.5 73.9 80.9 76.0 86.0 75.6 79.9 72.8 87.0 83.8 80.9 
Exit Quarter 86.6 88.2 85.8 88.8 88.1 85.7 87.0 87.8 86.7 84.9 82.9 86.6 
1 88.3 77.3 86.6 84.0 85.0 74.1 84.9 83.1 83.5 72.9 70.1 79.9 
4 79.1 69.5 73.1 66.8 67.4 64.1 70.7 67.4 66.0 62.9 62.1 67.8 
8 74.2 67.2 66.7 60.8 61.0 58.3 63.3 59.9 61.5 57.3 60.5 63.0 
12 73.2 65.3 61.1 56.3 58.0 54.5  57.5  56.1 59.5 60.7 
16 68.3   54.0  53.8      59.0 
             
Sample Size 51,276 94,662 29,873 42,883 59,881 50,229 23,706 36,934 50,823 55,259 60,901 556,427 
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Figure 4a.  Percentage of the 1997 TANF Leaver Cohorts Who Are Employed in the Indicated 
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Figure 4b.  Percentage of the 2000 TANF Leaver Cohorts Who Are Employed in the Indicated 
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Figure 4c.  Percentage of the 2001 TANF Leaver Cohorts Who Are Employed in the Indicated 
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Table 6.  Earnings (in current dollars, not adjusted for inflation) Before and After TANF Exit 
1997 Cohorts 2000 Cohorts 2001 Cohorts  





Year Relative to Exit             
-4 8,101 9,098 7,769 8,010 10,183 8,852 8,417 10,180 8,721
-3 8,151 9,633 8,205 8,426 8,376 10,763 9,662 9,546 8,734 10,559 9,108
-2 8,087 7,337 9,951 8,748 8,728 8,277 11,063 10,085 9,384 8,776 9,906 8,842
-1 7,456 6,544 8,527 8,213 7,709 7,248 9,188 8,627 8,103 7,581 7,808 7,687
Exit Quarter  
+1 10,747 10,295 11,986 11,612 10,979 11,018 15,144 11,965 11,079 11,049 11,522 11,266
+2 12,067 11,699 13,045 12,973 12,230 11,986 20,140 13,376 12,464 12,020 12,919 12,693
+3 13,262 13,137 13,800 13,957 13,268 12,778 14,324 12,856 14,421 13,464
+4 14,110 14,858 13,828 13,534 14,043
             
Sample Size 51,276 94,662 29,873 42,883 59,881 50,229 23,706 36,934 50,823 55,259 60,901 556,427
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4.  To What Extent Do Former TANF Recipients Participate in 
the UI Program? 
 Since we are interested in whether UI income support helps prevent return to TANF 
among those who lose jobs, from the cohort samples of those leaving TANF for employment we 
identify sub-samples of leavers beginning new spells of unemployment.  Use of UI is examined 
among those experiencing unemployment.  The definition of unemployment applied is as defined 
above: a calendar quarter with less than $100 in earnings. 
4.1  Unemployment among TANF leavers 
 Mean quarterly rates of new unemployment among TANF leavers are reported in Table 
7.  Also listed in the table are the cumulative annual rates of unemployment in the first three 
years after leaving TANF.  Quarterly percentages of new unemployment are highest in the first 
year after TANF exit in the range 10.5 to 13.8 across cohorts.  Rates are similar across states and 
rising as the labor market softens in the economic slowdown after 2000.  The quarterly 
unemployment rates decline in the second year after TANF exit to a range from 8.2 to 10.5, and 
fall to slightly lower levels in the third year to a range from 7.6 to 9.8.  Falling unemployment 
rates in the second and third years are observed despite the softening labor market in 2001.   
 
 Cumulative annual rates indicate the percentage experiencing unemployment in the first 
year after TANF exit ranged from 39.2 to 50.8 (see Figure 6).  The cumulative unemployment 
rates for TANF exiters rise in the second year to a range from 58.1 to 70.0 percent.  By the third 
year after TANF exit, the cumulative percentages experiencing joblessness ranged between 67.5 
and 77.9 of TANF exiters in the cohort samples.  Annual and cumulative rates of unemployment 
are similar across the four states.  Rates rose slightly with the economic slowdown. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Cumulative Percentages of TANF Leaver Cohorts Who Experience Unemploymen









































Table 7.  Unemployment Rates (percent) after TANF Exit 
1997 Cohorts 2000 Cohorts 2001 Cohorts  





Mean of Quarters             
    Year 1 10.5 11.6 12.1 13.8 13.1 12.3 13.1 13.8 13.7 12.9 13.2 12.6 
    Year 2 9.5 8.2 10.5 9.9 9.6 9.4 10.4 9.5 9.2 9.2 8.5 9.2 
    Year 3 9.6 7.6 9.8 8.4 8.2 8.3  8.1  7.9 7.8 8.3 
             
Cumulative (*1)             
    Year 1 39.2 41.3 44.8 50.6 48.3 45.4 48.4 50.8 50.5 45.7 46.0 45.9 
    Year 2 60.0 58.1 67.4 69.1 66.1 64.3 70.0 69.0 67.1 64.2 62.8 64.2 
    Year 3 73.4 67.5 79.5 78.0 74.9 73.8  77.9  73.2 71.9 73.4 
             
Sample Size 51,276 94,662 29,873 42,883 59,881 50,229 23,706 36,934 50,823 55,259 60,901 556,427
NOTE:  (*1) The cumulative unemployment rate is the percentage of persons in the cohort who become newly unemployed at any time after TANF Exit.  For 
example, in the Florida 1997 cohort, 73.4 percent of persons in the cohort had become newly unemployed at some point in the first 3 years after TANF exit.  
Also, the mean cumulative unemployment rate through 3 years across all cohorts (73.4 percent) is computed over only those cohorts for which data are 
observed for a full 3 years after TANF exit.  If all cohorts were used, including the 2001 cohorts for Florida and Ohio for which only eight and ten quarters of 
data are respectively observed after TANF exit, then the mean cumulative rate across all cohorts would be 73.1 percent as reported in Table 11.   
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4.2  UI claims among unemployed TANF leavers 
 Among those identified as newly unemployed in each of the analysis cohorts we examine 
patterns of application for UI benefits.  Table 8 lists UI application rates for each of the TANF 
leaver cohorts in the first three years after TANF exit (see also Figure 7).  Also, reported in the 
table is the total number from the cohort experiencing a new spell of unemployment and the total 
proportion of them applying for UI benefits combined over the three years after leaving TANF. 
 
 



































 Analysis of involvement with UI is restricted to those leaving TANF for employment 
who subsequently experience unemployment.  For the cohorts listed in Table 8, between 16,599 
and 63,937 experienced new spells of unemployment.  UI application rates range from 17.6 
percent to 42.7 percent.  In the second year after leaving TANF, UI application rates tend to be 
higher than in the first year.  This may be due to an understanding that adequate earnings are 
required to qualify for UI benefits and such earnings only accrue after a longer period of labor 
market experience.  There are much smaller differences in UI application rates between the 
second and third year after TANF exit.17  
                                                
 
 Within states, cumulative UI application rates showed an increase in Florida between 
1997 and 2000 cohorts, but were fairly stable over time among the cohorts.  There were only 
small increases in cumulative UI application rates between the 2000 and 2001 cohorts despite the 
economic slowdown in 2001.  A clear ranking of UI application rates over the 3 year period 
following TANF exit emerges across states.  Among newly unemployed TANF leavers, the 
highest UI application rates were observed for Florida, followed by Texas, Michigan, and Ohio.   
 
17Application rates among TANF leavers may be influenced by state rules requiring UI application to re-




Table 8.  UI Application Rates (percent) by Year from TANF Exit When First Newly Unemployed 
1997 Cohorts 2000 Cohorts 2001 Cohorts  





Time from Exit             
Year 1 13.8 17.2 35.8 14.2 13.8 18.1 38.9 20.4 15.6 21.5 19.0 19.0
Year 2 42.2 27.0 52.3 32.2 22.4 32.1 50.5 31.5 26.3 33.3 26.4 32.0
Year 3 42.1 29.3 50.2 36.3 28.4 38.1  35.1 36.0 47.4 37.0
   
Unemployed 37,621 63,937 23,755 33,460 44,835 37,072 16,599 28,756 36,515 40,469 43,462 406,481
UI Applicants 10,158 13,616 10,136 7,022 7,885 8,984 7,051 7,089 7,045 10,646 9,128 98,760
Rate (*1, percent) 27.0 21.3 42.7 21.0 17.6 24.2 42.5 24.7 19.3 26.3 21.0 24.3
NOTE:  (*1) Based on applications for UI benefits relative to the first unemployment after TANF exit.  A five calendar quarter period is checked for a new UI 
claim starting with the quarter before the quarter of new unemployment through three quarters after new unemployment.  The UI application date is the first 
UI benefit year begin (BYB) date in that time period.  
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4.3  Time from job separation to UI claim 
 To learn how quickly TANF leavers contact the UI system after becoming unemployed, 
the time lag from job separation to the date of UI application – also called the UI benefit year 
begin (BYB) date – was measured.18  Necessary data were available only for UI claimants in 
Florida, Michigan, and the Texas 2003 cohorts.  Some of these claimants did not receive UI 
benefit payments, but we used the BYB records showing their date of UI claim.  The time lag 
was measured in weeks.  Table 9 summarizes the time lags from job separation to UI application 
(BYB date) among cohorts overall and grouped by year after TANF exit when new 
unemployment occurred (see also Figure 8). 
 
 
Table 9.  Time Lag (in weeks) from Job Separation when First Newly Unemployed to UI Benefit 
Year Begin Date 
2000 Cohorts 2001 Cohorts 
New Unemployment 
1997 





    Year 1 after Exit 8.6 6.2 5.2 7.1 4.8 5.8 6.5 
    Year 2 after Exit 5.3 7.1 5.1 7.4 5.3 5.5 5.9 
    Year 3 after Exit 3.6 6.6 5.5  4.5 4.3 4.9 
    Year 4 after Exit 5.2  4.6    5.0 
    Total UI Applicants (*1) 11,915 9,601 7,796 6,499 6,921 3,738 46,470 
    Overall Mean Lag 5.6 6.6 5.2 7.2 4.9 5.1 5.8 
    Overall Median Lag 2.0 2.0 1.0 3.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 
NOTE:  (*1) Based on the quarter prior to new unemployment through three quarters after new unemployment using the Benefit 
Year Begin date (BYB) of the first UI application that occurs in that time period. This excludes persons who did not have a job 
separation date, had a separation date prior to TANF exit, or had a separation date that occurred after the Benefit Year End date 
(BYE) of the UI claim.  For the Florida 1997 and Michigan 2000 cohorts, mean UI application lags are also reported for persons 
who become newly unemployed for the first time in the fourth year after TANF exit.   
 
 
 UI claimants with BYBs in the first year after TANF exit tend to have longer lags 
between their job separation date and BYB.  TANF leavers who become unemployed in the first 
year after TANF exit may delay UI application because they have a lower expectation of 
qualifying for UI benefits with low accumulated earnings.  Similarly, inferior job matches may 
end sooner and be associated with contentious job separations resulting in lower expectations for 
UI benefit eligibility by the jobless. 
 
 Across the TANF leaver cohorts analyzed, the overall mean lag from job separation to 
BYB ranged from 4.9 to 7.2 weeks.  But the median lags were either 1.0 or 2.0 weeks in five of 
the six cohorts examined.  This means that at least half of newly unemployed TANF 
                                                 
18The UI benefit year is the 52 week period starting with the benefit year begin (BYB) date.  It is the time 
period during which available benefits resulting from a UI claim can be collected. The BYB date is the Sunday date 
in the week during which an application, or claim, for UI benefits is submitted to the state UI agency.  
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Figure 8.  Weeks from Job Separation to UI Benefit Year Begin Date by Year 














 Year 1  Year 2  Year 3
 
 
leavers filed their UI claims quickly.  The mean lag being longer than the median results from 
relatively small shares of the TANF leaver cohorts waiting for longer periods before they file UI 
claims. 
 
 Mean time lags from job separation to BYB were much shorter for UI applicants who 
were not TANF leavers.  Table 10 reports the time lags to be between 2.0 and 3.2 weeks among 
non-TANF leavers during the timeframes matched to analysis cohorts.  The simple unadjusted 
differences from TANF leavers were between 1.9 and 4.6 weeks.  
 
 
Table 10.  Time Lag (weeks) from Job Separation to UI Application for TANF 
Leavers and Differences from Other UI Applicants (*1) 
2000 Cohorts 2001 Cohorts  
 
1997 
Florida Florida Michigan Florida Michigan 
2003 
Texas 
       
TANF 5.7 6.6 5.2 7.2 4.9 5.1 
Non-TANF 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.4 3.2 
Simple Difference 3.73** 4.45** 2.77** 4.59** 2.54** 1.90**
Adjusted Difference 1.33** 0.43** 1.56** -1.11** 1.02** 0.83**
NOTE:  (*1) These estimates are computed applying the constraint that new unemployment occurred 
within three years of TANF exit. This explains why the mean time lag for the Florida 1997 cohort 
TANF leavers differs slightly from that reported in Table 9 where UI claims following new 
unemployment in the fourth year after TANF exit are included. 





                                                
 Estimates of adjusted differences in UI claim lags between TANF leavers and others 
were computed in regression models controlling for observable characteristics, UI program 
parameters, and labor market conditions.  The regression-adjusted differences tended to be 
smaller than unadjusted differences, but were in the same direction with TANF leavers waiting 
longer to apply for UI.  The smaller, regression-adjusted estimates suggest that much of the 
apparent difference in timing of UI application relative to job separation is explained by 
differences in observed characteristics between TANF leaver UI applicants and UI claimants 
without recent TANF involvement.  Even after accounting for differences between the two 
groups, however, TANF leavers delayed UI application longer in 5 of the 6 TANF leaver cohorts 
compared with UI applicants not recently involved with TANF.  The single exception was the 
Florida 2001 cohort wherein the regression-adjusted estimate suggests that TANF leavers 
established BYBs sooner than otherwise similar, non-TANF leavers.  The result in Florida was 
likely a consequence of the onset and aftermath of the economic slowdown that started in 2001.   
4.4  Eligibility for UI 
 Among TANF leavers who become newly unemployed and apply for UI, more than 90 
percent were initially UI eligible based on monetary requirements in eight of the eleven cohorts 
analyzed (Table 11).  Rates in the other three were 66.3 percent in the Ohio 2000 cohort, 61.4 
percent in the Ohio 2001 cohort, and 84.6 percent in the Florida 1997 cohort.  These rates are 
based on actual monetary determinations by UI agencies in the four states.  The lower monetary 
eligibility rates in Ohio result from the requirement for 20 or more weeks of work earning at 
least 27.5 percent of the state average weekly wage in UI covered employment.  Including Ohio, 
the mean rate of monetary eligibility across all cohorts is 90.9 percent.  
 
 In the time periods examined, UI monetary eligibility rates in half the TANF exit cohorts 
analyzed are at least as high as among UI claimants not previously involved with TANF.  To 
contrast monetary eligibility between the two groups, Table 12 reports simple differences and 
regression-adjusted differences between UI applicants who were TANF leavers and those who 
were not.19  For Ohio, UI claimants not previously involved with TANF have significantly 
higher monetary eligibility rates for UI than TANF leavers computed either as a simple 
difference or while controlling for observable characteristics in regression models. For the 
cohorts from the other states, there is no clear pattern of advantage for either TANF leavers or 
non-TANF leavers in terms of monetary eligibility. 
 
While TANF leavers compare to non-TANF leavers favorably in terms of monetary 
eligibility for UI, TANF leavers have much lower rates of UI eligibility based on initial non-
monetary factors.  TANF leavers have much higher rates of unfavorable job separation 
circumstances concerning voluntary job quits and dismissals for cause.  A summary of UI denial 
rates for quit or discharge from the prior employer is given in Table 12 which contrasts rates for 
TANF leavers with other UI claimants.  Among TANF leaver UI applicants, rates of quit or 
discharge ranged from 53.1 percent to 69.4 percent across the cohorts.  Disqualification rates in 
 
19Regression-adjusted differences are computed in models that include controls for: age, sex, race, multiple 
prior employers, number of quarters of TANF receipt prior to exit, change in county unemployment rate, indicator 




Table 11.  UI Entitlement and Benefit Receipt Among TANF Leavers 
1997 Cohorts 2000 TANF Cohorts 2001 Cohorts  





TANF Leavers 51,276 94,662 29,873 42,883 59,881 50,229 23,706 36,934 50,823 55,259 60,901 556,427
Newly Unemployed  37,621 63,937 23,755 33,460 44,835 37,072 16,599 28,756 36,515 40,469 43,462 406,481
UI Applicants 10,158 13,616 10,136 7,022 7,885 8,984 7,051 7,089 7,045 10,646 9,128 98,760
Monetarily Eligible 10,088 13,251 9,295 6,916 5,227 8,512 5,966 6,986 4,329 10,319 8,917 89,806
Non-monetarily Eligible (*1) 3,627 4,303 4,500 3,294 2,500 2,839 2,920 3,239 2,191 3,364 2,884 35,661
UI Beneficiaries 5,743 8,332 6,018 4,460 2,398 5,288 3,761 4,606 2,081 6,274 5,380 54,341
  
Newly Unemployed Rate (%) 73.4 67.5 79.6 78.0 74.9 73.8 70.0 77.9 71.8 73.2 71.4 73.1
UI Application Rate (%) 27.0 21.3 42.7 21.0 17.6 24.2 42.5 24.7 19.3 26.3 21.0 24.3
Monetarily Eligible Rate (%) 99.3 97.3 91.7 98.5 66.3 94.7 84.6 98.5 61.4 96.9 97.7 90.9
Non-monetarily Eligible Rate (%) 35.7 31.6 44.4 46.9 31.7 31.6 41.4 45.7 31.1 31.6 31.6 36.1
UI Beneficiary Rate (%) 56.5 61.2 59.4 63.5 30.4 58.9 53.3 65.0 29.5 58.9 58.9 55.0
  
UI Entitlement (weeks) 18.8 18.0 17.9 22.6 25.5 17.6 17.0 22.0 25.4 17.1 19.3 19.3
UI Received (weeks) 14.7 13.8 14.5 19.0 18.2 12.4 13.7 18.9 18.6 11.8 11.5 14.6
Entitlement Received (%) 78.9 83.6 80.8 79.3 71.6 83.4 80.8 80.7 73.0 82.8 78.4 80.4
Exhaustion Rate (%) 58.4 58.7 63.5 50.2 38.9 58.1 64.3 52.0 41.1 56.4 50.5 55.6
Weekly Benefit Amount $159 $163 $160 $203 $157 $162 $156 $198 $163 $158 $159 $167
Benefit Year UI Received $2,441 $2,359 $2,421 $3,919 $2,877 $2,096 $2,240 $3,780 $3,027 $1,928 $1,922 $2,545
Note:  UI received weeks are computed as dollars of UI received in the benefit year divided by the entitled UI weekly benefit amount.  Entitlement received 
percentage is the mean share of entitled UI benefit year dollars received by UI beneficiaries.  (*1) Due to limited data availability for Texas, the numbers of non-
monetarily eligible UI claims for the 1997, 2000, and 2001 cohorts were imputed using the non-monetary eligibility rate for the Texas 2003 cohort.  For all Ohio 
cohorts, the number and rate of non-monetary eligibility for UI is based on claims with benefit year begin (BYB) dates on or before December 31, 2002.  More recent 
UI data for Ohio received in December 2007, with BYB dates beginning January 1, 2003, did not contain characteristic information from which to determine non-






Table 12.  Monetary Eligibility, Quit or Discharge, and UI Beneficiary Rates (percent) Among Newly Unemployed TANF Leaver 
UI Applicants and Other UI Applicants Not Recently Involved with TANF 
1997 Cohorts 2000 Cohorts 2001 Cohorts  
Florida Texas Florida Michigan Ohio (*1) Texas Florida Michigan Ohio (*1) Texas 
2003 
Texas 







































































































































NOTES:  Tabulated means for TANF leavers are based on UI applications related to new unemployment occurring within three years after TANF exit for employment.  
Means for UI claimants not recently involved with TANF summarize all available data for each cohort.  Similarly, the estimated adjusted differences fully exploit all 
available data for each cohort.    
(*1) In the Ohio data there were multiple sources of information on job separation reasons.  The estimates presented here are based on the UI applicant’s presence in the 
non-monetary determination file containing information about non-monetary eligibility issues to be resolved.  Since we do not know the resolution of the issues, the 
mean quit and discharge rates are most likely overstated.   
** Significantly different from zero at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test. 






                                                
Texas and Ohio were highest, but more than 50 percent failed non-monetary eligibility in each of 
the Florida and Michigan TANF leaver cohorts.  Among newly unemployed TANF leavers who 
applied for UI the weighted mean rate of initial qualification for UI based on non-monetary 
factors across all cohorts was 36.1 percent (Table 11). 
4.5  Receipt of UI 
 Among TANF leavers who are UI applicants, the proportions receiving UI benefits in the 
analysis cohorts are presented in Table 11.  Final rates of UI benefit receipt within three years of 
leaving TANF for employment range from 29.5 percent in the Ohio 2001 cohort to 65.0 percent 
in the Michigan 2001 cohort.   
 
 Compared to the first year after TANF exit, UI beneficiary rates tend to be higher in the 
second and third years after leaving TANF (Table 13).  Final beneficiary rates can be high 
despite initially high rates of disqualification for non-monetary separation reasons since state UI 
laws deny UI benefit entitlement for only a fixed term, or until re-qualification occurs – usually 
through reemployment with additional earnings exceeding a required level.20  Claimants 
disqualified for failing non-monetary eligibility requirements can also appeal the denial.  
However, the appeal rate and the success rate among appeals is likely to be low among TANF 
leavers.   
 
 Among all UI applicants, beneficiary rates for TANF leavers were uniformly lower than 
for those not recently involved with TANF.  Table 12 shows the simple unadjusted differences in 
UI beneficiary rates to be between 8.3 percent and 36.1 percent lower for recent TANF leavers.  
Controlling for characteristics that influence UI eligibility, the beneficiary rates are between 2.4 
percent and 21.7 percent lower for recent TANF leavers.21
 
 Among TANF leavers who qualify for UI in the 1997 to 2003 cohorts, Table 11 shows 
the ranges of mean values for UI entitlement and benefit receipt.  UI weekly benefit amounts 
(WBA) range from $156 to $203, entitled durations of UI benefits range from 17.0 to 25.5 
weeks, and mean UI compensation received over the benefit year ranged from $1,891 to $3,919.  
The percentage of entitled benefits drawn ranged from 71.6 to 83.6, while the rates of exhausting 
UI benefit entitlements ranged from 38.9 to 64.3 percent.  
 
 
20The principle involved is that while an initial disqualification may be due to unacceptable behavior on the 
part of the claimant, continued joblessness is a consequence of conditions in the labor market.  Each state has 
specific rules for UI monetary qualification after a definite denial for benefits.  For the four states involved in this 
study the rules are:  Florida, earnings of 17 times the client’s weekly benefit amount (WBA); Michigan, earning the 
lesser of seven times the client’s WBA or seven times 40 times Michigan’s minimum wage (7 x 40 x MI minimum 
wage); Ohio, having six weeks of work in covered employment with the amount of wages in each week at least 27.5 
percent of the state’s average weekly wage; and for Texas, by earning six times the client’s WBA (USDOL 2001).  
Additionally, after a definite denial and adequate additional earnings and employment, the job separation must 
satisfy non-monetary eligibility requirements. 
21Regression-adjusted differences are computed in models which include controls for: age, sex, race, 
multiple prior employers, number of quarters of TANF receipt prior to exit, change in county unemployment rate, 




Table 13.  Beneficiary Rates (percent) Among UI Applicants by Year After TANF Exit When Newly Unemployed 
1997 Cohorts 2000 Cohorts 2001 Cohorts  





Year 1 52.7 60.5 53.3 60.0 29.2 55.7 49.0 64.0 22.3 56.9 57.6 51.5
Year 2 56.3 62.3 63.8 66.0 28.1 60.6 60.8 65.4 35.7 60.1 60.2 56.6
Year 3 60.6 61.3 66.8 66.7 37.3 63.1  67.4 62.9 63.3 61.1
Applicants (*2) 10,158 13,616 10,136 7,022 7,885 8,984 7,051 7,089 7,045 10,646 9,128 98,760
Average Rate 56.5 61.2 59.4 63.5 30.4 58.9 53.3 65.0 29.5 58.9 58.9 55.0
NOTE:  (*1) To observe new unemployment following TANF exit, eight and ten quarters are checked for the Florida 2001and Ohio 2001 cohorts respectively. For 
all other cohorts, twelve quarters subsequent to TANF exit are checked for new unemployment. 
(*2) UI application is identified in a new spell of unemployment by checking for a UI benefit year begin (BYB) date in the period starting with the quarter prior to 






 Rates of monetary and non-monetary eligibility together with UI beneficiary rates are 
presented graphically in Figure 9 for newly unemployed TANF leavers.  Over time, rates are 
stable within states, but there are some noteworthy differences across states.  The very high rates 
of monetary eligibility exceeding 90 percent in Florida, Michigan, and Texas are prominent.  
Beneficiary rates hover around 60 percent for these three states.  Non-monetary eligibility rates 
for the Ohio cohorts are low at around 30 percent, but on par with Texas.  Beneficiary rates in 
Ohio are slightly below the non-monetary eligibility rates.  But in all other states the UI 
beneficiary rates far exceed the non-monetary eligibility rates.    
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5.  Relationship Between UI Receipt and Return to TANF 
As background for understanding the relationship between UI benefit receipt and return 
to TANF, Table 14 summarizes across all cohorts the observed rates of return to TANF by UI 
application and beneficiary status for TANF leavers who become unemployed.  Rates of return 
to TANF are highest for UI applicants who do not become UI beneficiaries (see Figure 10).  
Rates of return to TANF by applicants who become UI beneficiaries are on par with TANF 
leavers who do not apply for UI after becoming unemployed.  There are some variations across 
cohorts in mean rates of TANF return, but the across cohort, summary means are indicative of 
the relative rates of return to TANF for the three groups of interest: non-UI applicants, UI 
applicants who do not get benefits, and UI beneficiaries.   
 
The overall mean rate of return to TANF among all newly unemployed TANF leavers is 
42.7 percent.  Considering subsets of this group, the mean TANF return rates are: 41.8 percent 
among those who do not apply for UI, 52.6 percent for those who apply for UI but do not get 
benefits, and 41.2 percent for those who apply for UI and do get benefits.  The difference in 
mean rates of return to TANF among UI applicants who received benefits and those who did not 
was 11.4 percentage points.  This suggests that among TANF leavers who become newly 
unemployed and apply for UI, beneficiaries return to TANF at a 21.7 percent lower rate than 





Table 14.  Rates of Return to TANF by UI Application and Benefit Receipt Status 
1997 Cohorts 2000 Cohorts 2001 Cohorts  





Newly Unemployed TANF Leavers 37,621 63,937 23,755 33,460 44,835 37,072 16,599 28,756 36,515 40,469 43,462 406,481
  No UI Application 27,463 50,321 13,619 26,438 36,950 28,088 9,548 21,667 29,470 29,823 34,334 307,721
  Apply for UI, no Benefits 4,415 5,284 4,118 2,562 5,487 3,696 3,290 2,483 4,964 4,372 3,748 44,419
  Apply for UI, get Benefits 5,743 8,332 6,018 4,460 2,398 5,288 3,761 4,606 2,081 6,274 5,380 54,341
  
Return to TANF - Total 15,422 24,935 10,150 18,007 22,716 15,014 6,744 15,160 18,325 16,552 10,692 173,717
  No UI Application  11,279 18,820 5,447 14,237 18,615 10,786 3,557 11,249 14,694 11,810 8,000 128,494
  Apply for UI, no Benefits 2,179 2,700 2,212 1,678 3,114 2,011 1,663 1,604 2,767 2,217 1,226 23,370
  Apply for UI, get Benefits 1,964 3,508 2,491 2,092 987 2,432 1,524 2,307 864 2,648 1,571 22,388
  
Return to TANF Total Rate (%) 41.0 39.0 42.7 53.8 50.7 40.5 40.6 52.7 50.2 40.9 24.6 42.7
  No UI Application 41.1 37.4 40.0 53.9 50.4 38.4 37.3 51.9 49.9 39.6 23.3 41.8
  Apply for UI, no Benefits 49.4 51.1 53.7 65.5 56.8 54.4 50.5 64.6 55.7 50.7 32.7 52.6
  Apply for UI, get Benefits 34.2 42.1 41.4 46.9 41.2 46.0 40.5 50.1 41.5 42.2 29.2 41.2
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In addition to comparing unadjusted mean rates of return to TANF, the relationship of UI 
benefit receipt and the probability of return to TANF was estimated on cohort samples of TANF 
leaver UI applicants in regression models.  Besides estimating the parameters on UI beneficiary 
variables, parameters on aspects of UI eligibility were estimated in the same models.  Results 
presented in Table 15 suggest that among TANF leavers who are UI applicants, either quitting or 
being discharged from the prior job is associated with an increased probability of returning to 
TANF.  On the other hand, receiving UI benefit payments is associated with a reduced 
probability of returning to TANF. Controlling for observable characteristics, receiving UI 
benefits was associated with a rate of return to TANF that was between 2.0 and 11.1 percentage 
points lower among UI applicants in the TANF leaver cohorts.  These estimates are based on 
behavior up to four years after TANF exit.  Any level of UI benefit receipt in that time is 
associated with a lower probability of returning to TANF.  
 
Regression models were also estimated to measure the association between the future 
amount of TANF benefits received and job quit, discharge, UI monetary eligibility, and UI 
benefit receipt (Table 15).  Results from these models suggest that quitting the prior job is not 
associated with a change in the amount of TANF received, but getting fired tends to be 
associated with an increase in the amount of future TANF benefits.  There was no correlation 
between UI monetary eligibility and the amount of future TANF, but receiving UI benefit 
payments was strongly associated with reduced future TANF benefits.  The estimated mean 
reduction was as large as $1,204 which was estimated for the Michigan 2001 cohort.   
 
The relationship between UI benefit receipt and the probability of return to TANF was 
also estimated in regression models on a pooled sample of 19,758 observations constructed from 
the 2000 TANF leaver cohorts for Florida, Michigan, and Ohio (see Table 16, Model I 2000).  
Similar regression models, excluding variables for quit, discharge, and job search exemption, 




Table 15.  Percentage Effects of Key UI Variables on the Probability of Returning to TANF and on the Dollar Amount of 
TANF Received by those Returning to TANF Estimated in Regression Models on Samples of UI Applicants 
1997 Cohorts 2000 Cohorts 2001 Cohorts  
Florida Texas Florida Michigan Ohio (*1) Texas Florida Michigan Ohio (*1) Texas 
2003 
Texas 
Return to TANF (%)           
    Quit 6.8**  3.4** 3.5** 2.1  5.1** 2.6* 2.9  4.1 
    Discharged 1.5**  1.9** 3.5** 3.7**  1.3 4.5** 3.3  4.4 
    Monetarily Eligible 10.1 8.0** 4.8** 4.4 5.9** 1.9 3.6** -20.2 3.5* 5.2** 0.0 
    UI Beneficiary -7.5** -3.3** -9.6** -7.8** -11.1** -4.5** -6.5** -7.0** -10.9** -2.6** -2.0* 
            
Amount of TANF ($)            
    Quit 9  -29 -54 293  14 4   -49 
    Discharged 4  36 394** 288*  10 233**   -7 
    Monetarily Eligible -249 181* 64 1,374 96 -25 -30 2,999 127 97 73 
    UI Beneficiary -104 -148** -108** -708** -720** -81** -101* -1,204** -700** -165** -13 
            
NOTES:  The dependent variables in the return to TANF models take the value of one for return to TANF, else zero.  These linear probability models were 
estimated by ordinary least squares regression, as were the amount of TANF models.  The latter were estimated on samples of TANF returnees. (*1) For the 
Ohio 2000 and 2001 cohorts, the regression parameter estimates on indicator variables for quit and discharge are based on UI benefit year begin (BYB) dates 
on or before December 31, 2002.  However, the estimation samples also include new UI payment data received by the Upjohn Institute in December 2007 for 
UI claims with BYB dates between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2005.  These data included information on monetary eligibility and beneficiary status, 
but not on job separation reason or other characteristics.  While there were sufficient observations to estimate parameters on quit and discharge for both 
models on the 2000 Ohio cohort and the model of probability of return to TANF for the 2001 Ohio cohort, there were not enough observations to estimate 
similar parameters in the amount of TANF model for the Ohio 2001 cohort.  Characteristics variables in models on all cohorts are specific to each state and 
take advantage of all administrative data available.  Variables included in all models are: age, educational attainment, race, prior earnings, local labor market 
conditions, and year:quarter of BYB.  
** Difference significantly different from zero at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test. 
* Difference significantly different from zero at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test. 
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(see Table 16, Model II 2000 and Model III 2001).  The estimation samples were 21,377 and 
17,343 for the 2000 and 2001 cohorts respectively.  Variables for quit, discharge, and job search 
exemption were not included in the latter models, because data on these variables were not 
sufficiently available for the Ohio 2001 cohort.22  
 
Model I provides additional evidence that job quits and discharges increase the likelihood 
of returning to TANF.  In all three pooled models, UI benefit receipt was associated with a 
reduction in the mean rate of return to TANF.  Parameter estimates on the UI beneficiary 
variable range between -9.6 and -11.6 percentage points.  This range includes the simple 
unadjusted difference of means, -11.4 percentage points, computed between UI beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiary UI applicants (Table 14).  Collectively, these estimates suggest that among 
TANF leavers who apply for UI, beneficiaries rate of return to TANF is about 20 percent lower 
than the 52.6 percentage rate for UI applicants who do not receive benefits.    
6.  UI as Income Replacement for TANF Leavers 
Among TANF leavers who experience unemployment, those who qualify for and draw 
UI benefits receive income replacement at rates much higher than those paid by TANF.  Levels 
of income replacement from TANF and UI are compared on a monthly basis.  The influence of 
the UI-to-TANF benefit ratio on rates of returning to TANF is also estimated.   
 
To compare levels of income support provided by TANF and UI, we look only at 
beneficiaries who received both.  Restricting the TANF beneficiary sample to include only those 
who also received UI benefits does not significantly alter the mean estimated monthly TANF 
benefit level.  The mean level of UI compensation is estimated from actual payment data rather 
than simply by using the full entitled weekly benefit amounts.  Our relative measure of 
generosity applies the most inclusive measure of TANF benefits and the most conservative 
measure of UI benefits. The UI/TANF generosity ratio is based on 6 months of prior TANF 
payments and actual UI payments over the full UI benefit year. 
 
Measures of TANF, UI, and TANF to UI relative generosity are summarized in Table 17 
(see also Figure 11).  Across the eleven cohorts for analysis, monthly TANF benefits range from 
$113 to $226, monthly UI benefits range from $389 to $693, and ratios of monthly UI-to-TANF 
range from 2.0 to 4.6. 
 
The relationship between the UI-to-TANF benefit ratio and the rate of return to TANF 
was estimated in linear probability models.  The results suggest that among newly unemployed 
TANF leavers who become UI beneficiaries, an increase in the ratio of UI-to-TANF might 
slightly reduce the likelihood of returning to TANF.  However, the parameter estimate on UI-to-
 
22Demographic variables for age, gender, and educational attainment are included in the three regression 
models by sets of indicator variables (Table 16).  To represent each demographic variable a full set of categorical 
indicators was included with the restriction that the sum across all categories for a variable of the sample proportion 
times the category indicator is constrained to zero.  OLS estimation with this restriction permits inclusion of a 
separate intercept term in each model.  Estimated coefficients on categorical indicator variables are interpreted 
relative to the variable mean.   
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Table 16.  Model of Return to TANF Based on Pooled UI Applicant Data for 2000 and 2001 TANF 
Leaver Cohorts from Florida, Michigan, and Ohio 








Intercept 0.637** 0.668** 0.631** 
UI Beneficiary -0.096** -0.116** -0.102** 
Florida TANF Leaver 
Michigan TANF Leaver 










Job Separation Reason, Quit 
























Education, Less than High School Graduate 
Education, High School Graduate or GED 
Education, Some College 













Weekly Benefit Amount (WBA, $10) 
WBA at Maximum 







  -0.001* 
-0.032 
-0.001 
Earnings in UI Base Period ($1,000) 
Earnings Total less than $10,000 in UI Base Period 










Multiple Employers in Any Base Period Quarter 
Employed in 0 or 1 Consecutive Quarters Before BYB 
Employed in 2 to 4 Consecutive Quarters Before BYB 
Employed in 5 to 8 Consecutive Quarters Before BYB 
Employed in 6 to 12 Consecutive Quarters Before BYB 
 






















Unemployment Rate as of the UI BYB Month 






   0.011* 
NOTES: The dependent variables in these models take the value one for return to TANF, else zero.  These linear probability 
models were estimated by OLS.  (*1) For Model I 2000 the Ohio data include UI claims with benefit year begin dates (BYB) on 
or before December 31, 2002.  For Model II 2000 and Model III 2001 additional UI data was used for Ohio with BYB dates 
between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2005.  However, the added Ohio data included only payment information from UI 
administrative files.  Therefore, variables for quit, discharge and job search exemption were excluded from Model II 2000.  Data 
on other exogenous characteristics for Ohio in Model II 2000 and Model III 2001 were obtained from the TANF and wage 
record data sets.  Characteristics variables included age, educational attainment, race, prior earnings, local labor market 
conditions and year: quarter of BYB. Sample sizes are:  19,758 (Model I 2000), 21,377 (Model II 2000) and 17,343 (Model III 
2001).  Adjusted R-squares are: 0.11(Model I 2000), 0.10 (Model II 2000) and 0.11 (Model III 2001). 
** Significantly different from zero at the 95 percent confidence level for a two-tail test. 





Table 17.  UI-to-TANF Relative Generosity and the Percentage of UI Beneficiaries Who Return to TANF 
1997 Cohorts 2000 Cohorts 2001 Cohorts  
Florida Texas Florida Michigan Ohio Texas Florida Michigan Ohio Texas 
2003 
Texas 
Monthly TANF ($,*1) 145 124 123 212 226 124 113 203 220 123 125
Benefit Year UI Pay ($) 2,441 2,359 2,421 3,919 2,877 2,096 2,240 3,780 3,027 1,928 1,891
Entitled Weeks of UI 18.8 18.0 17.9 22.6 25.5 17.6 17.0 22.0 25.4 17.1 19.5
Actual Monthly UI ($,*2) 520 546 540 693 452 477 526 686 476 525 389
UI-to-TANF Benefit Ratio 3.6 4.4 4.4 3.3 2.0 3.9 4.6 3.4 2.2 4.3 3.1
Return to TANF Rate (%,*3) 42.0 42.1 41.4 46.9 41.2 46.0 40.5 50.1 41.5 42.2 29.2
UI-to-TANF Parameter (*4) -0.0008 -0.001** -0.0015** 0.0000 -0.0022 -0.0022** -0.004** 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 -0.0012
NOTE:  (*1) Monthly TANF is the sum of payments in the two quarters before leaving TANF divided by six. 
(*2) Monthly UI compensation is four times actual UI compensation received in the benefit year divided by weeks of entitlement (potential duration). 
(*3) Return to TANF rates are computed for all cohorts applying sample restrictions to permit comparisons across cohorts.  New unemployment must have 
occurred within three years of TANF exit, and checking for return to TANF is done for three years after the last possible cohort exit date.  There are only two 
exceptions to these rules.  For the Florida 2001 cohort, two years after TANF exit are checked for new unemployment, and checking for return to TANF is 
done for two years after the last possible cohort exit date. For the Ohio 2001 cohort, checking for new unemployment is limited to ten quarters after TANF 
exit, but return to TANF is checked for the normal three years after the last possible cohort exit date. 
(*4) These are parameter estimates on the UI-to-TANF benefit ratios in single state models similar to the pooled linear probability models summarized in 
Table 16 explaining the probability of return to TANF based on observable factors. 
** Significantly different from zero at the 95 percent confidence level in a two-tail test. 
* Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent confidence level for a two-tail test. 
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TANF relative generosity was statistically significant only for four of the eleven cohorts.  The 
parameter estimates suggest that a one unit increase in the UI-to-TANF ratio decreases the rate 
of return to TANF by between 0.15 and 0.40 percentage points.  Given that the return to TANF 
rate is 41.2 percent among TANF leaver UI beneficiaries (Table14), an increase in monthly UI 
benefits by the mean TANF amount reduces return to TANF by between four tenths and one 
percentage point--an extremely small effect.23   
                                                
 
Combined with our earlier observation that UI receipt is associated with a lower rate of 
return to TANF, this evidence that increases in UI-to-TANF relative generosity are not generally 
associated with the rate of return to TANF, suggests that UI benefit receipt might be serving as a 
proxy for strong labor force attachment.  In other words, it might not be the income replacement 
function of UI that reduces return to TANF, but more importantly those who receive UI benefits 
have better prospects for maintaining self-sufficiency through employment.  
7.  Do State-Level Trends in UI Benefit Receipt Help Explain 
Trends in TANF Caseloads?  
Summaries of state level trends in numbers of TANF caseloads, UI beneficiaries, and 
those who are low income and unemployed are presented in Table 18 and Figures 12, and 13.  
Counts for each quarter are listed by state over the full range of data available; some data series 
are longer than others.  Numbers of those who are low income and unemployed are counted 
among UI beneficiaries.  Low-income unemployed are defined as having earnings of less than 
$2,500 in the quarter before the starting date of the UI benefit year.24    
 
Trends in UI beneficiaries and the low-income unemployed are illustrated graphically in 
Figures 12 and 13.  To eliminate seasonal fluctuations, the figures present data smoothed by 
 
23An increase in the UI-to-TANF ratio by one is equivalent to an increase in monthly UI benefits by the 
mean TANF amount.  There are differences in the UI-to-TANF ratio larger than one across the cohorts examined, so 
this degree of variation is within the observed range.   




Table 18.  TANF Caseloads, UI Beneficiaries, and Low Income Jobless (*1) Over Time 






























19963 86,208   164,865      202,604 88,783 25,191 
19964 82,022   158,393      199,815 93,810 29,062 
19971 73,560   150,269      197,831 98,836 25,100 
19972 67,261   144,134      170,118 89,251 26,361 
19973 62,968   140,185      176,275 86,223 24,388 
19974 57,114   135,401      169,213 83,517 23,859 
19981 56,327   128,759      154,395 91,068 20,676 
19982 48,911   120,438      135,010 86,751 22,150 
19983 46,469   110,549      124,463 91,190 20,819 
19984 45,021 47,454 17,212 101,651      117,027 101,795 24,780 
19991 41,666 50,642 16,852 92,967      111,003 96,632 19,460 
19992 36,395 59,193 19,929 88,382      102,200 100,506 24,612 
19993 35,657 58,340 20,822 83,844      99,037 87,395 21,100 
19994 35,422 44,719 16,689 78,988      98,391 87,342 21,954 
20001 24,626 47,020 16,846 74,901   108,954 61,293 14,987 95,464 83,357 18,239 
20002 21,218 57,099 23,121 71,412   106,312 36,380 11,328 94,746 79,813 18,188 
20003 19,636 65,246 30,976 68,592   103,918 45,478 11,157 98,852 75,101 15,778 
20004 20,012 52,123 21,298 68,428   100,383 85,564 15,865 102,287 88,442 20,029 
20011 17,291 64,453 20,515 69,400 129,575 20,215 95,344 87,745 18,455 100,059 97,826 17,744 
20012 16,515 80,201 26,372 70,855 74,569 16,712 92,858 56,514 15,798 95,809 122,047 21,396 
20013 18,241 93,551 31,673 72,473 136,625 20,631 93,604 60,952 15,575 96,605 135,685 22,726 
20014 20,050 91,155 32,452 75,669 174,453 29,247 94,670 91,903 21,925 100,941 148,831 27,854 
20021 19,348 80,870 43,072 77,217 130,758 30,868 94,724 70,188 41,011 101,643 144,747 36,315 
20022 17,743 86,491 40,220 74,572 102,415 24,998 93,255 51,843 33,695 96,057 142,933 35,854 
20023 19,127 83,766 37,064 69,720 86,027 17,768 93,117 37,360 19,891 96,678 132,006 27,973 


































20024 19,840 71,735 27,135 70,333 157,160 23,842 94,061 81,625 25,985 98,758 132,170 29,305 
20031 18,092 77,763 28,943 72,644 121,782 24,145 93,227 74,280 28,384 98,355 82,792 15,752 
20032 16,371 86,699 35,491 74,610 113,856 19,526 93,056 63,941 29,472 93,161 105,860 29,215 
20033 18,150 81,828 37,219 76,806 103,231 17,305 94,542 60,704 24,293 91,257 161,146 64,746 
20034 17,905 65,552 29,850 77,837 141,973 24,112 94,937 94,238 28,947 72,693 162,496 68,768 
20041 15,357 69,940 30,404 77,483 113,637 23,586 94,406 88,846 28,597 63,414 120,934 23,887 
20042  75,023 33,608 78,808 77,591 17,790 93,708 59,483 23,687 54,907 115,906 26,057 
20043  94,514 63,005 78,761 112,215 17,317 94,225 52,651 17,906 54,119 106,264 21,079 
20044    79,503 132,402 20,009 94,529 79,472 20,282 53,120 88,641 18,148 
20051    78,340 120,968 21,861 92,423 77,812  47,290 99,121 17,898 
20052    78,140 76,761  90,194 50,584  39,565 100,157 19,975 
20053    78,523 109,038  90,648 51,665  37,951 115,567 23,698 
20054    79,128 132,097  90,704 77,441  37,506 85,105 17,756 
20061    77,630 122,592  88,265   32,799 70,794 10,810 
20062       80,030   27,898 68,305 10,896 
20063          27,024 66,016 9,910 
20064          27,570 66,943 10,227 
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four-quarter moving averages.  Numbers of TANF caseloads declined steadily over the years 
observed, with rates declining faster before the year 2000 than after.  Influenced by trends in 
aggregate business activity, counts of UI recipients tended to rise in the quarters leading up to the 
start of 2002 then gradually declined.25  The numbers of low-income unemployed rose in two of 
the states up to the start of 2002, but were flat or declining in all states after that time. 
 
State trends in UI benefit receipt do not help explain trends in TANF caseloads. There is 
no identifiable link between aggregate declines in TANF caseloads and trends in total UI 
recipients at the state level.  A regression was run on the counts data listed in Table 18 for 
Florida, Michigan, and Ohio.  As reported in Table 19, there was no measurable influence of the 
aggregate level of UI beneficiaries on the number of TANF caseloads.  The parameter estimate 
on the number of beneficiaries is not statistically significantly different from zero. 
 
                                                 
25The UI counts include all beneficiaries in the states and are not limited to TANF leavers. 
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Table 19.  Macro Model of TANF Caseloads Over Time Using Pooled Data 






Intercept 36,982 5,721 6.46 
    
Number of UI Beneficiaries -0.004 0.031 -0.14 
    
Unemployment Rate 2,033 1,183 1.72 
    
Ohio 76,053 1,085 70.11 
Michigan 56,101 2,072 27.07 
    
Year and Quarter = 1999:1 -3,421 4,243 -0.81 
Year and Quarter = 1999:2 -8,363 4,260 -1.96 
Year and Quarter = 1999:3 -9,810 4,262 -2.30 
Year and Quarter = 1999:4 -8,866 4,263 -2.08 
Year and Quarter = 2000:1 -16,587 3,718 -4.46 
Year and Quarter = 2000:2 -18,893 3,732 -5.06 
Year and Quarter = 2000:3 -21,216 3,729 -5.69 
Year and Quarter = 2000:4 -21,696 3,884 -5.59 
Year and Quarter = 2001:1 -29,278 3,673 -7.97 
Year and Quarter = 2001:2 -29,451 3,544 -8.31 
Year and Quarter = 2001:3 -28,782 3,704 -7.77 
Year and Quarter = 2001:4 -28,061 4,060 -6.91 
Year and Quarter = 2002:1 -29,810 4,210 -7.08 
Year and Quarter = 2002:2 -30,808 3,891 -7.92 
Year and Quarter = 2002:3 -31,833 3,812 -8.35 
Year and Quarter = 2002:4 -30,367 3,902 -7.78 
Year and Quarter = 2003:1 -32,598 4,293 -7.59 
Year and Quarter = 2003:2 -32,088 4,131 -7.77 
Year and Quarter = 2003:3 -30,229 4,086 -7.40 
Year and Quarter = 2003:4 -28,421 3,904 -7.28 
Year and Quarter = 2004:1 -31,158 4,188 -7.44 
Year and Quarter = 2004:2 -29,531 4,247 -6.95 
Year and Quarter = 2004:3 -29,361 4,290 -6.84 
Year and Quarter = 2004:4 -28,393 4,323 -6.57 
Year and Quarter = 2005:1 -31,928 4,814 -6.63 
Year and Quarter = 2005:2 -31,334 4,175 -7.50 
Year and Quarter = 2005:3 -30,368 4,072 -7.46 
Year and Quarter = 2005:4 -29,249 4,091 -7.15 
Year and Quarter = 2006:1 -29,641 5,063 -5.85 





                                                
Only a small fraction of TANF leavers receive UI benefits.  Among TANF leavers 
observed in this study, about 73 percent become unemployed within 3 years, 24 percent of these 
apply for UI benefits, with 55 percent of applicants becoming beneficiaries.  This suggests that 
about 10 percent of TANF leavers receive UI benefits.  
 
When asking if UI receipt helps to explain the downward trend in TANF caseloads, the 
implicit question is whether UI benefits act as a source of household income in place of TANF 
income support, thereby preventing return to TANF by newly unemployed TANF leavers.   
Three paths were examined after leaving TANF for work and then subsequently becoming 
unemployed: (1) those who did not apply for UI return to TANF at a mean rate of 41.8 percent, 
(2) UI applicants who do not receive UI benefits return to TANF at a mean rate of 52.6 percent, 
and (3) UI beneficiaries return to TANF at a rate of 41.2, similar to the rate for non-UI 
applicants.  Among TANF leaver UI applicants, those who received UI returned to TANF at 
significantly lower rates.   
 
The person-level analysis identifies an important role for UI in supporting TANF leavers.  
But the significantly larger scale of the UI program makes it difficult to establish a clear 
statistical relationship between TANF caseload declines and numbers of UI beneficiaries at the 
aggregate level.   A compositional analysis of UI claims showed that the numbers of recent 
TANF recipients among UI applicants were flat over the period of years examined (O’Leary 
2007).  Furthermore, the share of UI beneficiaries who lost high paying jobs increased at the 
same time, meaning TANF recipients actually declined as a share of all UI beneficiaries.  In the 
years 1997 to 2003, the UI program operated to support self-sufficiency of TANF leavers, but 
the mass exodus from TANF did not overburden the federal-state UI system.   
8.  Summary 
Since PRWORA established TANF in 1996 as the main federally funded program for 
cash assistance to needy families, the number of TANF recipients has declined dramatically.  
Approximately 73 percent of TANF leavers experience unemployment within three years of their 
exit.  Between 18 and 43 percent of newly unemployed TANF leavers apply for UI benefits.26  
 
Among TANF leavers applying for UI, more than 90 percent had sufficient prior earnings 
to qualify for UI benefits in Florida, Michigan, and Texas.  In Ohio a strict employment 
requirement results in monetary eligibility rates of about 60 percent.    
 
For TANF leavers who apply for UI, between 31 and 47 percent qualify for UI based on 
the circumstances of their job separation.  Among UI applicants, TANF leavers had much higher 
rates of voluntary quits and discharges for cause than did other UI applicants.   Among TANF 
leavers who apply for UI, between 30 and 65 percent ultimately receive benefits.  The rate of UI 
receipt among TANF leavers increases with the time since TANF exit that application for 
benefits occurs.  TANF leavers who apply for UI in the first year after exit have lower 
 
26 Application rates among TANF leavers may be influenced by state rules requiring UI application to re-
qualify for TANF cash assistance. 
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beneficiary rates than those who apply in the second or third year after TANF exit.  Longer 
employment after TANF exit means higher earnings to qualify for UI. 
 
Among TANF leavers who become unemployed and apply for UI, receipt of UI benefits 
reduces the rate of return to TANF.  Across all cohorts, the mean rate of return to TANF among 
UI applicants who do not become UI beneficiaries is 52.6 percent and is the highest among 
TANF leaver groups.  Rates of return to TANF by UI beneficiaries (mean 41.2 percent) and 
TANF leavers who do not apply for UI after becoming unemployed (mean 41.8 percent) are both 
significantly lower (Table 14).  Pooling data across states on samples of TANF leavers who 
become unemployed, UI benefit receipt was associated with a reduction in the mean rate of 
return to TANF of 11.4 percentage points or about 22 percent from the 52.6 percent mean rate of 
TANF return to TANF among UI applicants who do not receive benefits.  
 
Among TANF leavers who experience unemployment, those who qualify for and draw 
UI benefits receive income replacement at rates much higher than the income support provided 
by TANF.  Across the analysis cohorts, the ratio of UI-to-TANF ranges from 2.0 to 4.6 with a 
mean of about 3.6 across all cohorts.  While UI receipt reduces the rate of return to TANF, 
controlling for observable characteristics, higher benefit levels of UI relative to TANF have only 
a modest association with a reduction in rate of return to TANF.  Nonetheless, the example of 
Ohio merits further investigation.  The ratio of monthly UI to monthly TANF is much lower in 
Ohio.  While the observed rate of return to TANF in Ohio is no higher than the other states, the 
rate of initial exit from TANF appears to be lower.  We have identified the weeks of work 
component of the Ohio UI monetary eligibility test as the main cause of lower UI eligibility 
rates, the lower relative generosity of UI-to-TANF also merits investigation as a factor 
influencing movement to self-sufficiency.   
 
The numbers of TANF recipients declined since 1996 with rates of decline faster before 
the year 2000 than after.  Counts of UI recipients tended to rise in the quarters leading up to the 
start of 2002 then gradually declined.27  There is no identifiable link between aggregate declines 
in TANF recipients and trends in total UI recipients at the state level.  The numbers of TANF 
leavers who are UI beneficiaries has remained steady in the years since 1996.  Over that period, 
the share of UI beneficiaries who lost high paying jobs has increased, meaning that the share of 
all UI beneficiaries who were TANF recipients has declined.   
 
Aggregate analysis may not be sufficient to understand fully if a trend toward declining 
numbers of TANF recipients was reinforced by the availability of UI benefits.  The person-level 
analysis identifies an important role for UI in supporting TANF leavers.  The significantly larger 
scale of the UI program makes it difficult to establish a clear statistical relationship between total 
TANF caseloads and numbers of UI beneficiaries at the aggregate level.  
 
27The UI counts include all beneficiaries in the states, and are not limited to TANF leavers.
 
 45
9.  Directions for Future Research 
This study finds evidence that receipt of UI benefits is associated with a reduction in the 
rate of return to TANF.  On a monthly basis, UI benefits are two to five times more generous 
than TANF payments.  But small changes in the relative generosity of UI-to-TANF do not affect 
the rate of return to TANF.  Taken together, these results suggest that UI benefit receipt might be 
serving as a proxy for strong labor force attachment.  In other words, it might not be the income 
replacement function of UI that reduces return to TANF, but more importantly those who receive 
UI benefits have better prospects for maintaining self-sufficiency through employment.  Further 
investigation into the relative importance of UI income support and labor force attachment could 
inform policy.  
 
Among all UI applicants, TANF leavers have lower rates of qualifying for UI benefits. 
The main reasons for lower rates of UI eligibility among TANF leavers are voluntary job quits 
and dismissals for cause by employers.  Analysis of the characteristics of TANF leavers who 
voluntarily quit or get fired from new jobs could provide guidance for efforts to promote job 
retention and advancement among recent TANF leavers.   
 
Earlier studies estimated small increases in UI eligibility rates among TANF leavers for 
changes in state policies governing alternate UI base year computations and waiver of the rule 
requiring availability for full-time work.  The Ohio 20 weeks of work requirement severely 
limits eligibility, while earlier researchers did not find similar effects for the 20 weeks of work 
rule in New Jersey.  The difference is the Ohio required level of earnings in each of the 20 
weeks.  The interaction of this rule with TANF work requirements should be investigated.  
 
It is also worth investigating why rates of return to TANF are similar after a new spell of 
unemployment for UI beneficiaries and those who do not apply for UI benefits.  What 
characteristics do these two groups share and how are they different from TANF leavers who 
apply but fail to receive UI benefits?    
 
Analysis in this study was done on a series of 11 state and year cohorts of TANF leavers.  
This approach was driven by the way data gradually became available during the course of the 
project.  Given the current accumulation, these data could be reorganized into five, six, and 
seven year series for each of the states.  This new structure would permit more efficient 
estimation of state specific effects, and computation of reliable point estimates of year effects 
within states.  Additionally, new data from 1996 to the present are now available for the state of 
Georgia.  In addition to TANF payment, UI payment, and quarterly wage records, the Georgia 
data include histories of employment and employment services use.  Employment and training 
services are increasingly important instruments supporting self-sufficiency for TANF leavers.  
Knowing the value of UI and reemployment services together in supporting family independence 




Appendix A:  Time Frames Defining Analysis Cohorts 
 
For the 2000 TANF cohort, the time frame for observing TANF receipt is calendar year 
2000.  TANF exit must have occurred on or before the first calendar quarter of 2001.  This 
definition yields sample sizes adequate to reliably estimate the influence of UI on return to 
TANF.   Applying this rule, the other TANF exit cohorts are defined as: 
 
1997 Cohorts: TANF receipt 1997Q2 to 1998Q1 and exit by 1998Q2 
2000 Cohorts: TANF receipt 2000Q1 to 2000Q4 and exit by 2001Q1 
2001 Cohorts: TANF receipt 2001Q1 to 2001Q4 and exit by 2002Q1 
2003 Cohort: TANF receipt 2003Q1 to 2003Q4 and exit by 2004Q1 
 
After the quarter of TANF exit, exactly 12 quarters are checked for the first episode of 
new unemployment.  For each cohort, return to TANF is checked for up to 12 quarters after the 
last exit quarter from TANF for that cohort.  That is: 
 
1997 Cohorts check until 2001Q2 
2000 Cohorts check until 2004Q1 
2001 Cohorts check until 2005Q1 
2003 Cohort check until 2007Q1 
 
This means that return to TANF is checked for at least 12 quarters (and up to 15 quarters) 
after exit from TANF.   
 
The presence of UI claims are checked for in quarters (Q-1) to (Q+3) relative to the 
quarter of new unemployment.  This means checking for UI claims could be done after the last 
quarter of checking for return to TANF.  However, in regression models presented in this report 
no UI data is used from after the last quarter for checking return to TANF.  That is, for the four 
cohort times the upper limits on measuring variables for regression models respectively are: 
2001Q2, 2004Q1, 2005Q1, and 2007Q1.   
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Appendix B:  Glossary of UI Related Terms and Acronyms 
 
Adjusted Difference This is the difference in means from two samples adjusting for the 
differences in observable characteristics of individuals in the two samples. 
For example, the adjusted difference in the UI beneficiary rate between 
TANF and non-TANF persons accounts for differences across the two 
groups in age, gender, race, educational attainment, UI qualification 
criteria, industry and occupation of past employment, local labor market 
conditions, and county of residence.  Adjusted differences are often 
computed in a multiple regression model with a binary indicator variable 
for inclusion in one of the samples, or after statistical matching.   
 
Base Period  Typically, the first four of the five quarters prior to UI filing that are used 
to determine if the individual has sufficient wage credits to qualify for UI. 
 
Beneficiary  Someone who received a UI payment. 
 
Benefit Year  The 52 week period starting with the BYB date.  It is the time period 
during which available benefits resulting from a UI claim can be collected. 
  
BYB   Benefit year begin (BYB) date is the Sunday date in the week an 
application, or claim, for UI benefits is submitted to the state UI agency. 
 
BYE   Benefit year end (BYE) date is the Saturday date in week 52 weeks after 
the BYB date of an application for UI benefits. 
 
Cohort   A data sample for analysis that has been constructed using clearly 
specified selection criteria. For example, in this study the Michigan 2000 
cohort includes persons who received TANF benefits in Michigan at some 
point in 2000 and left TANF for employment by the first quarter of 2001. 
 
Entitled Duration The maximum number of weeks an individual can collect UI benefits.  
The duration of UI entitlement depends directly on the level of base period 
employment and earnings up to a maximum set by the state legislature.  
Most states provide a 26 week maximum duration of entitlement; 
Massachusetts and Washington provide up to 30 weeks. 
 
Exhaustee  Someone who collects all available UI benefits, the maximum benefits 
payable (MBP), during their benefit year.   
 
FTE Weeks  Full-time Equivalent Weeks of UI is defined as the total amount of UI 
compensation someone received in their benefit year divided by their 




MBP   Maximum Benefits Payable is the maximum amount of UI benefits 
someone could collect during their benefit year and is computed as the 
weekly benefit amount (WBA) multiplied by entitled duration in weeks. 
 
Monetary  A UI claimant has sufficient employment and earnings history to qualify  
Eligibility   for UI benefits. 
 
New   The first quarter with earnings less than $100 for someone who exited  
Unemployment  TANF for employment. 
 
Non-Monetary A UI claimant had a job separation that did not disqualify him or her  
Eligibility  from collecting UI benefits. That is, the job separation did not involve a 
voluntarily quit or justifiable dismissal for cause.  Furthermore, that 
claimant is able, available, and actively seeking full-time work. 
 
OLS   Ordinary Least Squares is a statistical technique to estimate parameters of 
a linear relationship between an outcome of interest (such as returning to 
TANF) and factors (variables) thought to influence that outcome. 
 
Simple Difference The result from subtraction of one sample mean from another.  It is simple 
in contrast to an adjusted difference that measures the difference in means 
across two samples while controlling for observable characteristics of 
sample observations.  
 
TANF   Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. 
 
TANF Exit  After TANF receipt, the first quarter in which TANF payments are zero 
while earnings are $100 or more in that or the following calendar quarter.   
 
TANF Leaver  Someone who satisfies the conditions for TANF exit.  
 
UI   Unemployment Insurance 
 
UI Eligible  An applicant for UI who satisfies both monetary and non-monetary 
eligibility conditions to receive UI benefits. 
 
WBA   Weekly Benefit Amount or the amount of UI paid to someone who is 
unemployed and does no paid work in a particular week.  The WBA for an 
individual increases with the prior level of earnings and is set between 
minimum and maximum limits determined by state legislatures based on 
considerations of social adequacy and sufficiency.  Modest earnings 
during a UI benefit year week can result in a weekly UI compensation 
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